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ARTICLE 
THE PROMISE OF 
JOHANNESBURG: FISHERIES 
AND THE WORLD SUMMIT ON 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
TIM EICHENBERG" & MITCHELL SHAPSON'" 
INTRODUCTION 
As the ancient proverb says, "Give a man a fish and he will 
eat for a day. Teach a man to fish and he will eat for the rest of 
his life." But teaching a man to fish sustainably is another 
matter entirely. 
The recent and dramatic decline of world fish stocks, and 
the international response to the world fish crisis, was one of 
the key issues addressed at the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (hereinafter "WSSD" or "World Summit") held in 
Johannesburg, South Mrica in September 2002.' Attended by 
• Tim Eichenberg is an environmental lawyer in San Francisco, and attended 
the World Summit in Johannesburg in 2002 for Oceana, an international conservation 
organization. He is an Adjunct Professor of Law at the Vermont Law School, and re-
ceived his J.D. from Washington University School of Law and a postdoctoral fellow-
ship in marine policy from the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. He is grateful 
for the insights of Paul KibeI, Jorge Varela and Michael Hirshfield in preparing this 
article. 
'" Mitchell Shapson is an attorney with the Pacific Coast Federation of Fisher-
mans Associations (PCFFA) and teaches Trial Practice at the University of San Fran-
cisco School of Law. He received his J.D. in 1986 and his LL.M in Environmental Law 
in 2003, both from QQlden Gate University School of Law. The analysis and opinions 
expressed by Mr. Shapson in this article are his own, and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of PCFF A or IFR. 
1 World Summit on Sustainable Development, 2002 (hereafter "WSSD"), See 
generally, www.johannesburgsummit.org, and Report of the World Summit on Sustainable 
587 
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tens of thousands of participants from 191 countries, the WSSD 
was convened by the United Nations to promote the ambitious 
goals set forth ten years earlier at the United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development (hereinafter "UNCED" 
or "Earth Summit") in Rio de Janeiro objectives of "poverty 
eradication, changing unsustainable patterns of production and 
consumption, and protecting and managing the natural re-
source base of economic and social development.'" 
This article briefly examines the world fish crisis and the 
factors that drive overuse of ocean resources. It identifies some 
of the major trends in ocean fishing that have led to over-
exploitation and briefly reviews the weaknesses of interna-
tional fishery arrangements that led to WSSD. It describes 
and evaluates the outcomes of the WSSD and suggests some 
measures that can and must be taken to the address the crisis 
facing world ocean fish stocks. 
In many ways, the WSSD lacked the dramatic outcomes of 
the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio.3 No new international agree-
ments or treaties were concluded, and there was considerable 
disappointment by the failure to meaningfully address poverty 
eradication, health, climate change, renewable energy and 
other critical issues. But ocean fisheries fared well in Johan-
nesburg when compared to the lack of significant progress on 
many of these other issues. Important targets and timetables 
were established to restore depleted fish stocks, manage fishing 
capacity, prevent illegal and unregulated fishing, and create 
marine protected areas. In so doing, the WSSD reflects a 
global consensus that specific actions are urgently needed to 
sustain world fish stocks and ocean resources. 
Development, available at http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doclUNDOC/GENIN02l636/93IPDF/ 
N0263693.pdf(last visited March 29, 2004). 
2 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (1992) [herein-
after "UNCED"J. The quote is from the WSSD, Plan of Implementation, [d. at Para-
graph 2. 
3 The Earth Summit brought together the largest collection of world leaders ever 
to focus on the state of the global environment and its sustainable use. Center for 
Marine Conservation, No Place to Hide: Highly Migratory Fish in the Atlantic Oceana, 
Ellen Peel (1995) at 116 [hereinafter "CMC"J. Three major agreements were adopted 
at UNCED: The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (UN Doc. 
NCONF.151126 (Vol. I), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992), Agenda 21 (UN Doc. 
NCONF.151126 (Vol. I-III) (1992) and the Statement of Forest Principles. Two conven-
tions were also opened for signature: the Convention on Biological Diversity (31 I.L.M. 
818 (1992) and the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN Doc. NAC.237/18, 
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 848 (1992». 
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II. THE WORLD FISH CRISIS 
A. THE WORLD'S LARGEST COMMONS 
In The Tragedy of the Commons, Garrett Hardin relates 
the parable of the so-called "rational herder," who grazes more 
and more cattle and increases profits without regard to the ef-
fects on the common pasture: Eventually the pasture is over-
grazed and ruined. As Hardin notes: 
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that 
compels him to increase his herd without limit in a world that 
is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, 
each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes 
in the freedom of the commons. Freedom m a commons 
brings ruin to all . ... (emphasis added)5 
It takes little imagination to see the oceans as the world's 
largest commons: From Roman times, and before, up to the 
end of World War II, the dominant legal concept regarding the 
right to fish was the law of capture; i.e., whoever caught it, 
owned it.7 Since the capacity of the oceans was believed to be 
inexhaustible, the number of fish taken was not considered to 
be a serious limitation." Moreover, the costs of removing fish 
from the ocean are low compared to other extractive activities 
such as logging, mining, or oil and gas drilling. In the oceans' 
commons, the externalities or costs are paid by all while profits 
accrue to a few. Therefore, it is in each fisher's interest to 
catch as many fish as possible without regard to the oceans' 
finite resources. This scenario, like the common pasture, sows 
the seeds of overexploitation and ruin. 
4 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Comnwns, 168 Science 1243 (1968). 
5 [d. at 1244. 
6 A commons can be described as "resources held in common by a group of peo-
ple, all of whom have access and who derive benefit with increasing access. ~ Joanna 
Burger, The Tragedy of the Commons, Environment, December 1998. 
7 R.P. Anand, Changing Concepts of Freedom of the Seas: A Historical Perspec-
tive, in Van Dyke, et al., Freedom for the Seas in the Twenty-First Century, 74-5. 
8 "I believe ... that probably all the great sea fisheries, are inexhaustible ... ~ 
Thomas Huxley, Inaugural Address, Fisheries Exhibition (1883) vol. 4:1-22. The Fish-
eries Exhibition Literature, London. This sentiment has been echoed often over the 
years. 
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B. WHERE ARE ALL THE FISH? 
Fish are the world's single largest source of animal protein 
exceeding beef, sheep, poultry, and eggs: Fishing is also an 
important economic activity, contributing $28.6 billion dollars 
to the United States economy in 2001.10 Thirty-five million 
people are directly engaged in fishing or fish farming world-
wide, and the world fishing fleet exceeds 4 million vessels.11 It 
is therefore not surprising that the amount of fish caught (pro-
duction) rose dramatically over the last fifty years as indicated 
by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (hereinafter 
"F AO") in the figure below.12 
~~------------------------------~~~=---
M~ __________________________ ~~ __________ _ 
t5~ __________________ ~~ ____________ _ 
5 






The chart above shows how, with the advent of industrial 
fishing practices, production increased over six-fold from 1950's 
9 Global Marine Biological Diversity, Elliott Norse (ed), Island Press (1993) at 
17. 
10 America's Living Oceans, Charting a Course for Sea Changes, Report to the 
Nation, Recommendations for a New Ocean Policy, Pew Oceans Commission, May 
2003, pg., 35 (hereinafter "Pew Oceans Commission"), available at www.pewoceans.org/ 
oceans/oceans]eport.asp (last visited March 29, 2004). 
11 The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture, 2002, FAO, Fisheries Depart-
ment, www.fao.org/docrep/005/y7300ely7300e04.htm#P40_12993. 
12 The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture, 1996, FAO, Fisheries Depart-
ment, available at www.fao.org/DOCREP/0031W3265E1w3265e07.jpg (last visited 
March 29, 2004). 
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to the 1990's.'3 This dramatic increase in production has taken 
its toll and threatens the sustainability of world fish stocks. In 
the last decade fish production has leveled off and may actually 
be declining." As shown in the chart below, seventy-five per-
cent of fish stocks are now at levels at or above sustainable 
amounts; i.e. stocks that are depleted, overexploited, fully ex-
ploited, or recovering. 15 
FIGURE 37 







o 10 20 30 40 50 "'-.... 
NoIe: R = _1/14 0 = depleted: 0 = overexploited; F = fully exploUd: 
M • rnodI!raIeIy expIalti!d; U • ~ploiti!d 
~;fAO 
13 Predicting fish stocks based upon total landings is a precarious proposition. It 
is a little like estimating the population of a city based upon the murder rate, and 
ignores fish that are incidentally killed as "bycatch" (twenty-five percent of global land-
ings), and illegal, unreported and unregulated fisheries. Thus total moralities from 
fishing are likely to be vastly under-reported. 
14 Reg Watson and Daniel Pauly, "Systematic Distortions in World Fisheries 
Catch Trends," Nature, Nov. 29, 2001, at 534-536. Using computer models to correct 
for inaccurate fish-catch reports, the authors show that the global fish catch, which 
averaged close to 100 million tons for the past decade, may have actually been declin-
ing by as much as 600,000 tons annually for the past five-ten years. 
15 The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture, 2000, FAO, Fisheries Depart-
ment, available at www.fao.org/DOCREP/003IXS002E/xS002e06.htm#P12 (last visited 
March 29, 2004). Stocks that are fully exploited are on the brink of being overfished 
and have no margin for error for inaccurate reporting of catch, waste and bycatch, ever 
more efficient gear, or over-capacity of fishing fleets. [d. 
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The urgency of the world fish crisis is underscored by a re-
cent study showing that "the global ocean has lost more than 
ninety percent of its large predatory fishes," species such as 
tuna, billfish, sharks and swordfish.16 The study shows that 
modern industrial fishing practices have become so efficient 
that it typically takes only fifteen years to catch eighty percent 
of particular species. The study is the first analysis to show 
general pronounced declines of entire communities of fish 
across widely varying ocean ecosystems, clearly dispelling the 
notion of the unlimited capacity of the sea. The potential eco-
system effects of removing ninety percent of large predators 
from the open ocean are extremely troublesome, chiefly because 
such declines are so widespread and difficult, if not impossible, 
to reverse. 17 Moreover, coastal ecosystem functions and struc-
tures that have lost large predatory fishes, mammals, and rep-
tiles show marked and profound negative changes. 18 
Specific examples of depleted fish stocks abound. Bluefin 
tuna populations in the southern Pacific and Indian Oceans are 
estimated to be two percent of 1960 populations.19 Cod stocks, 
once so abundant that early explorers marveled that they 
needed only to drop a bucket off the boat to catch them, crashed 
in 1978 and will need to remain closed for another ten to fifteen 
years for the stock to support the pre-1950 catch levels in At-
lantic Canada. 20 Depleted cod and other groundfish stocks are 
costing New Englanders approximately 14,000 jobs and $350 
million annually in gross income.21 Pollock, used as a substi-
tute for cod, is now also drastically depleted.22 Atlantic halibut 
is all but commercially extinct, haddock was declared commer-
16 Ransom A. Myers and Boris Worm, Rapid worldwide depletion of predatory 
fish communities, Nature, Vol. 426, at 280-283, May 2003. 
17 [d. at 282. 
18 Jackson, J.B., et aI., Historical ouerfishing and the collapse of coastal ecosys· 
tems, 293 Science, 629-638 (2001). 
19 See http://archive.greenpeace.org/commsl97/oceanipress/sept09.html (last 
visited March 29, 2004). See also infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
20 Mark Kurlansky, Cod, A Biography of the Fish That Changed the World, Pen-
guin Books 1997; and see, Craig S. Smith, North Sea Cod Crisis Brings Call for Nations 
to Act, N.Y. Times, November 7, 2002, at A-3. 
21 New England Groundfish: From Glory to Grief, Center for Marine Conserva-
tion (1996) at ix. 
22 Craig S. Smith, North Sea Cod Crisis Brings Call for Nations to Act, N.Y. 
Times, November 7, 2002, at A-3. 
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cially extinct in 1994,23 and Atlantic salmon was listed as an 
endangered species in the Gulf of Maine.2' 
At one time U.S. fish stocks in the Pacific were touted as 
an example of exemplary fisheries management, but no more.25 
Of the sixteen species of Pacific groundfish for which there is 
data, nine are designated as overfished.26 The population levels 
of some rockfish species, like bocaccio, decreased by ninety-
eight percent (i.e. two percent of original biomass)/7 as noted in 
the graph below.2B 
140% 
-¢-y,jdow 
120% ~ dar1<bl~ched 
G) 
urflshed ~canary u c 100% (II -+- bocaccio "tI 
c -¢-cow::od ::J 80% .a ~pop ( 
G) 60% > reblilling ;01 
III __ ta.!9! __ 
i 40% a: 
20% 
0% 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Year 
23 CMC, supra note 3, at 41. 
2. 65 Fed. Reg. 69469-69483 (Nov. 17, 2000). 
25 National Marine Fisheries Service, Groundfish Bycatch Preliminary Pro· 
grammatic Environmental Impact Statement, November 2003 (hereinafter "Bycatch 
EIS"), available at www.nwr.noaa.gov/lsustfsh/groundfish/eis_efb/pseislPrelimDEIS/ 
Chapter3.pdfOast visited March 29,2004). 
26 A species is overfished if the "rate or level of fishing mortality . . . jeopardizes 
the capacity of the fishery to produce the maximum sustainable yield on a continuing 
basis." 16 U.S.C. § 1802(29). 
27 65 Fed. Reg. 221, 230 (Jan. 4, 2000). 
2B Bycatch EIS, supra note 25 at 3·14. 
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Other species, like cowcod, may take nearly a full century 
to rebuild.29 Bocaccio and lingcod are so seriously overfished 
that they may be at risk of extinction.3O As a result of this cri-
sis, the National Marine Fisheries Service (hereinafter 
"NMFS") shut down the U.S. continental shelf from Canada to 
Mexico to bottom fishing for groundfish in 2002."1 
There are also many examples of overfished foreign fish 
stocks. A three-year study by the World Fish Center indicates 
that fish stocks in the Philippines today are ten percent of what 
they were in the 1940's, and that an hour's effort of fishing in 
the Gulf of Thailand yields just under sixteen kg of fish com-
pared to just over 140kg in 1966. 32 Orange roughy populations 
in New Zealand are decimated from overfishing, marbled rock-
cod are seriously depleted in the Southern Ocean,33 and the In-
ternational Union for the Conservation of Nature (hereinafter 
"IUCN") lists more than fifty species of sharks and rays on its 
Red List of Threatened Species.34 According to the U.N. Atlas 
of the Oceans, the world's seventeen major fishing areas have 
"reached or exceeded their natural limits," and nine are in seri-
ous decline."s 
Despite this evidence, the world fish crisis still has its 
skeptics. An association of seafood producers cited a list of U.S. 
fishery success stories in a letter to Congress in June 2003 to 
rebut the Pew Oceans Commission call for major reforms in 
29 66 Fed. Reg. 2338, 2351 (Jan. 11,2001). 
30 The extinction of a marine fish species was once believed impossible. J.A. Mu-
sick, et aI., Marine, Estuarine, and Diadrorrwus Fish Stocks at Risk of Extinction in 
North America, American Fisheries Society, Vol. 25, No. 11, 6-30 (2000). 
31 National Marine Fisheries Service, Northwest Region, Coordinates for Rock-
fish Conservation Areas, Dec. 17, 2002, available at 
http://swr.nmfs.noaa.gov/news/RockfishConservationAreaCoordinates.pdf (last visited 
March 29, 2004). For a discussion of the impacts of this massive closure see: Tom 
Knudson, State of Denial: Harvesting the Sea, The Sacramento Bee, April 27, 2003, 
available at www.sacbee.com/static/live/news/projects/deniaV (last visited March 29, 
2004); and Keith Easthouse, Deep Trouble, North Coast Journal, July 18, 2002. 
32 See: World Fish Center, Sustainable Management of Coastal Fish Stocks in 
Asia, Project Final Report (March 1998 - March 2001) available at 
www.worldfishcenter.org/trawVactivitieS/finalreportlfinalreport.asp. 
33 Sustaining Marine Fisheries, Commission on G1Josciences, Environment and 
Resources, Ocean Studies Board, National Research Council (1999). 
34 See www.redlist.org (last visited March 29, 2004). 
3S Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations, United Nations Atlas of 
the Oceans, available at www.oceanatlas.org (last visited March 29, 2004). 
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss3/6
2004] THE PROMISE OF JOHANNESBURG 595 
u.s. fisheries management.36 The letter claims that "robust 
fisheries conservation and utilization in the U.S., far from 
needing massive overhaul and reform, requires only minor ad-
justments to ensure that sustainable use remains the guiding 
principle for U.S. fisheries policy."37 The vice president of mar-
keting at the Red Lobster restaurant chain, one of the world's 
largest buyers of seafood, sees no "imminent crisis in the 
world's ability to supply seafood. I believe the free-market sys-
tem is a fantastic regulator of natural resources like seafood."38 
Yet if the Outback Steakhouse restaurant chain had extended 
its 'Lobsterfeast' promotion from November to a full year, "it 
would have required the world's lobster harvest."39 
AB pressure to catch at historical levels grows, the pres-
sure to capture fish that are too young to breed also grows:o 
Such conduct drastically reduces a stock's ability to reproduce, 
and the "ecological price we're paying for maintaining catch is 
getting higher and higher."" It also exacts significant economic 
costs; "[o]ne study indicates that 300,000 jobs and eight billion 
dollars in annual revenues have been lost because of overly 
aggressive fishing practices alone."" 
C. FACTORS DRIVING THE WORLD FISH CRISIS 
A number of factors drive the world fish crisis. Some are 
related to unsustainable fishing methods, and some are related 
36 Letter from The Seafood Coalition to Members of Congress, June 2, 2003. The 
U.S. success stories include New England groundfish, scallops and Atlantic herring, 
stripped bass and summer flounder, shrimp, king and Spanish mackerel, Pacific sar-
dines and swordfish, Alaskan crab, salmon, halibut and groundfish, and North Atlantic 
swordfish, available at, www.fishingnj.org/seafoodcoalitionletter.html(last visited 
March 29, 2004). 
37 Id. at 3. 
38 Andrew Dunn quoted in Nation's Restaurant News. Milford Prewitt, Seafood 
Depletion Issue Pits Chefs' Boycotts vs. Opponents' Claims of 'Junk Science', Nation's 
Restaurant News, July 26, 1999. 
39 Id. 
40 Carl Safina, Where Have All the Fishes Gone~ Issues in Science and Technol-
ogy, Vol. X, No.3 (1994) University of Texas at Dallas. 
41 Quote from Dr. Daniel Pauly. Janet Raloff, How low will we go in fishing for 
dinner?(effect of fishing on food web}, Science News, February 7, 1998 (hereinafter 
RaloID. 
42 Robert J. Wilder, et al., Saving Marine Biodiversity, Issues In Sci. & Tech. 
Online, Spring 1999, at 1, available at www.nap.edU/issues/15.3/wilder.htm (last vis-
ited March 29, 2004) (copy on file with the Law Review office). 
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to other human activities. We focus on overfishing, destructive 
fishing practices, and habitat destruction and pollution. 
1. Overfishing 
Overfishing occurs when fish are killed faster than they 
can reproduce, and the effects of overfishing on ocean ecosys-
tems can be devastating.43 According to nineteen prominent 
scientists, "ecological extinction caused by overfishing preceded 
all other human disturbance to coastal ecosystems, including 
pollution, degradation of water quality, and anthropogenic cli-
mate change."" 
Overfishing since the middle of the last century has been 
the result of an explosion of fisheries technology, and a dra-
matic increase in the size and efficiency of the world's fishing 
fleet. During the 1950's-1960's, the fishing industry adapted 
various military technologies for hunting on the high seas; ra-
dar to navigate in total fog; sonar to detect schools of fish in 
deep ocean waters; electronic navigational aids such as Global 
Positioning Systems to return to sites where fish gather and 
breed; satellite weather maps to track water temperature 
fronts that indicate the likely location of fish; and tracker 
planes to spot fish. 45 
The number of fishing boats increased exponentially dur-
ing the end of the Twentieth Century. Between 1970 and 1990, 
the world's industrial fishing fleet grew at twice the rate of the 
global catch, doubling the number and total tonnage of fishing 
vessels"· China's fishing fleet, for example, grew six-fold since 
1979, controls thirty-eight percent of the world's 1,200,000 
decked fishing boats, and catches three times that of the next 
biggest producer." 
43 The terms "overfishing" and "overfished" mean a rate or level of fishing mortal-
ity that jeopardizes the capacity of a fishery to produce the maximum sustainable yield 
on a continuing basis. 16 USC § 1802(28) . 
.. Jackson, J.B.C., et at, Historical Over/ishing and the Recent Collapse of 
Coastal Ecosystems, 243 Science 629-638 (2001). 
45 Carl Safina, The World's Imperiled Fish, Scientific America, November 1995, 
at 4 (hereinafter "World's Imperiled Fish"), and International Maritime Satellite Or-
ganization (INMARSAT). 
46 World's Imperiled Fish, supra note 45, at 6. 
47 United States Information Service, February 3, 1999, EPF306. 
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The expansion and overcapacity of fishing fleets has been 
fueled by government subsidies. Fishing subsidies increased 
greatly after the extension of national exclusive economic zones 
(hereinafter "EEZ") to 200 miles.48 The fishing industry in-
curred costs totaling $124 billion to catch seventy billion dol-
lars worth of fish in 1994," much of the deficit supported by 
massive government subsidies which have increased since 
then.5O The Canadian government spent three dollars for every 
dollar earned by fisheries in the 1990's.51 It is estimated that 
global fishing fleets are about 250 percent greater than needed 
to catch what can be sustainably harvested,sz and that govern-
ments are subsidizing the fishing industry by fifteen to twenty 
billion per year, representing roughly twenty percent of the 
global catch.53 
Subsidies take the form of low cost government loans, 
guarantees against default, tax breaks, and general services to 
assist the fishing industry.54 Australia, for example, provides 
tax rebates to commercial fishing vessels for diesel fuel con-
sumption, and Japan allows an additional depreciation of five 
years and sixteen percent for fishing boats, estimated to be 
worth about $4.2 billion annually to the fishing industry. 55 
General services for fisheries research, management and en-
forcement activities, and infrastructure costs such as harbor 
improvements and dredging are often provided free or at a 
greatly reduced cost to the fishing industry. 56 
." Dick Russell, Vacuuming the Seas; Where Countries Collide, E Magazine, July, 
1996, at 28. One author states that the "200-mile limit was not seen in Canada, the 
United States, or anywhere else as a conservation measure, but rather as a protection-
ist measure for the national fisheries." Kurlansky, supra note 20, at 18I. 
49 World's Imperiled Fish, supra note 46, at 6; Earth Action Network, January, 
2000. 
50 World Wildlife Fund(WWF), Government subsidies for fishing, available at 
www.panda.org/about_wwf7what_ we_do/marinelwhat_ we_dolsustainable_fisherieslover 
fishing/subsidies.cfin (last visited Mar. 26, 2004); see also www.ieep.org.uk (last visited 
March 29,2004). 51 Kurlansky, supra note 20, at 178. 
52 Id. at 4. 
53 Id., and Robert P. Steenblik and Paul F. Wallis, Subsidies to Marine Capture 
Fisheries: The International Information Gap, at 8, 15 (hereinafter Steenblik and Wal-
lis). 
54 Id. at 8, 15. 
55 Id. at note 8. 
56 Id. at 16. 
11
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2. Destructive Fishing Practices 
Advances in fishing gear technology, such as longlines and 
driftnets, have also greatly contributed to overfishing and de-
structive fishing practices. Each day, approximately five mil-
lion baited hooks are set on 100,000 miles of longlines through-
out the world's oceans making pelagic longline fishing "the 
world's most widespread hunting activity."57 Up to fifty miles 
long and carrying thousands of hooks, longlines take signifi-
cant numbers of non-target species compared with more selec-
tive fishing methods such as harpoons and rod and reel fishing. 
Longlines are a major reason that large predatory species like 
swordfish, bluefin and bigeye tuna have declined by as much as 
ninety percent during the past twenty years.58 Non-target by-
catch from longlines also take a wide variety of species classi-
fied as vulnerable and endangered by the IUCN including 
leatherback and loggerhead sea turtles, black footed albatross, 
and great white sharks.59 It has been estimated that 65,000 
albatross and other birds have drowned in the last twenty 
years due to the use of 10nglines,60 and that longlines targeting 
swordfish are responsible for sixty to 100 percent of the bycatch 
of sea turtles, sea birds, and marine mammals in the U.S:' 
Driftnets, two and one-half kilometers or more, drift with 
the currents and winds to entangle fish. 62 The largest driftnets 
can encircle a dozen 747 jumbo jets and catch 200 tons of fish 
per day. Large pelagic drift nets (exceeding 2.5 kilometers) are 
so deadly they were banned on the high seas by the United Na-
tions in 1992 after it was determined that they killed forty-two 
million non-target species including sea birds and marine 
mammals.63 Driftnets, however, are still allowed in many na-
tional EEZs. 
57 Larry Crowder and Ransom Myers, A Comprehensive Study of the Ecological 
Impacts of the Worldwide Pelagic Longline Industry, 2002 at xi (on file with the au-
thors) (hereinafter Crowder and Myers). 
58 Myers and Worm, supra note 16 at 280. 
59 Crowder and Myers, supra note 57 at 112. 
60 Green Peace, Empty Seas, Empty Future, available at archive.greenpeace.org! 
comms/97/ocean/report/bluefin.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2004). 
61 Crowder and Myers, supra note 57 at xiii. 
62 16 U.S.C. § 1802(23). 
63 U.N. G.A., 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. AlRES/46/215 (79th plenary meeting, 20 Dec. 
1991). 
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Bycatch is a major consequence of destructive fishing prac-
tices. Bycatch occurs when marine life are unintentionally cap-
tured and killed by commercial and recreational fisheries, be-
cause fishing gear and practices are not selective, and because 
target species exist in habitats occupied by a wide range of 
other species.64 Bycatch includes non-target species caught in 
the course of fishing operations, species of the wrong size or 
quality, unobserved species killed by entanglement in lost or 
discarded fishing gear, and species like coral and sponges de-
stroyed by nets dragged along the ocean floor during bottom 
trawling operations. 
Approximately forty-four billion pounds of fish are dis-
carded each year as bycatch in commercial fisheries, roughly 
twenty-five percent of the world's total landings.65 This stag-
gering figure does not even include unobserved bycatch, species 
incidentally captured but retained, or bycatch from recrea-
tional fisheries. Bycatch also does not technically include the 
hundreds of thousands of incidentally killed marine mammals, 
seabirds, and other non-fish species, such as the 400,000 dol-
phins killed annually by the eastern Pacific yellowfin tuna 
fishery during the 1970's and 1980's.66 Nor does it include 
thirty percent of the global fish catch that is converted into fish 
meal to feed cattle, chickens, and farm-raised fish, or made into 
fertilizer and oil.67 By whatever measure, the unnecessary 
waste of important natural resources from bycatch greatly con-
tributes to the world fish crisis and destruction of ocean ecosys-
tems.68 
64 The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture, 1998, FAO, Fisheries Depart-
ment, available at www.fao.org/docrepIW9900E/w9900e03.htm#P8 (last visited March 
29,2004). 
65 FAO Fisheries, Fisheries Bycatch and Discards, Rome, Italy 17-20 March 
1997, available at www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/W3862E.htm (last visited March 29, 
2004). Alverson, Dayton L., Discarding Practices and Unobserved Fishing Mortality in 
Marine Fisheries: An Update, NMFS, April 29, 1998. 
66 The public outcry from dolphin deaths in the tuna fishery led to the so-called 
dolphin safe tuna labels and conservation measures which drastically reduced dolphin 
deaths during the past 10 years. Unfortunately, a byproduct of new fishing methods 
that avoid setting nets around dolphins was increased bycatch of other species such as 
billfish, sea turtles, and sharks. World's Imperiled Fish, supra note 45, at 8. 
67 Inter Press Service - Global Information Network, March 16, 1994; More than 
35 million tons offish are used for animal feed. NRC Report, supra note 33 at 19-35 
68 Larry B. Crowder and Seven A Murawski, "Fisheries Bycatch: Implications for 
Management," 23.6 Fisheries Management 8-17 (1998). 
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Overfishing, whether from overcapacity or unsustainable 
fishing practices, results in the serial depletion of valuable fish 
species, called "fishing down the food chain."69 Targeting un-
derutilized species may be "less valuable" to humans, but they 
may be essential to the health of ocean ecosystems.70 As noted 
by a prominent marine scientist, "by overfishing the top preda-
tors, we've eliminated the marine equivalent of lions and 
wolves and are moving towards the taking of rats, cockroaches, 
and dandelions."7l But even the removal of a single species can 
have ripple effects throughout the marine ecosystem that we 
are just beginning to understand.72 
3. Habitat Destruction and Pollution 
Coral reefs provide shelter for nearly one-quarter of all 
known marine species and are home to over 4,000 species of 
fish and thousands of other forms of plant and animal life. Sci-
entists estimate that more than one million species of plants 
and animals are associated with coral reef ecosystems,"3 and 
that coral reefs are second only to rainforests in the amount of 
biodiversity they contain. Yet only thirty percent of the world's 
coral reefs are in good condition. Human activities have al-
ready destroyed ten percent of the world's reefs. Thirty percent 
of the reefs that have not been destroyed are in critical condi-
69 Daniel Pauly, et aI., Fishing down the marine food webs, 279 Science 860-863 
(1998). 
70 Murwaski, S.A., Definition of overfishing from an ecosystem perspective, 57 
ICES Journal of Marine Sciences 649-658 (2000). 
7l Raloff, supra note 41, quoting Elliot A. Norse of the Marine Conservation Biol-
ogy Institute. 
72 For example, overfishing Atlantic cod in the Gulf of Maine during the 1920s 
caused a population explosion of sea urchins. Because urchins eat kelp, kelp forests in 
the Gulf of Marine were destroyed which in tum increased coastal erosion. Jackson, 
supra note 46. Similar declines among important kelp beds along the U.S. Pacific coast 
also occurred because of the removal of sea otters and other species that prey on sea 
urchins. Paul K. Dayton, et aI., 2002, Ecological Effects of Fishing in Marine Ecosys-
tems of the United States, Pew Oceans Commission, available at 
www.pewoceans.org/oceans/oceans]eport.asp (last visited March 29, 2004), (hereinaf-
ter Dayton). 
73 International Coral Reef Network, Coral ReefInformation: Why should I care?, 
available at www.coralreef.org/coralreefinfo/care.html(last visited Mar. 26, 2004). 
14
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss3/6
2004] THE PROMISE OF JOHANNESBURG 601 
tion, and sixty percent of the reefs may die in the next twenty 
to forty years if current mortality rates remain the same,'· 
The destruction and decline of coral reef ecosystems is a 
well known and documented phenomenon caused by a number 
of factors some directly related to destructive fishing practices, 
such as bottom trawling and fishing with dynamite and cya-
nide, while others are unrelated to fishing, such as climate 
change, coral bleaching, pollution, sedimentation, and dredg-
ing,'5 
What is less understood is that extremely fragile and ecol-
ogically important colonies of sea corals and sponges that exist 
deep in ocean waters are also in jeopardy.76 Thousands of spe-
cies of fish and invertebrates depend upon coral and sponge 
habitat, some thousands of years old, for feeding, breeding, and 
protection. New scientific studies show that these habitats are 
crucial for fisheries, fish species, and healthy ecosystems, and 
that the disruption and destruction of these communities could 
devastate ocean ecosystems. Due to their longevity and slow 
growth, deep sea coral and sponge habitats are especially vul-
nerable. 
Deep-sea trawlers now operate bottom-tending mobile fish-
ing gear (bottom trawling) to depths exceeding 6,000 feet." 
Bottom trawling makes vulnerable deep-sea habitats, which 
were once out of harms waY,78 and damages and destroys these 
sensitive biological systems before they can be discovered.79 
7. Amy Michelle Resetar, About Coral Reefs: Reef Destruction Rates, at 
www.personal.psu.edulusersla/mlamr221lcoral_destruction.htm (last visited March 29, 
2004). 
75 See for example; Protecting Coral Reefs: The Principal National And 
International Legal Instruments , 26 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 499, 505-507 
(2002); available at www.coralreef.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2004); and Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA, Coral Reefs: Critical Biodiversity and 
Fisheries Resources, available at www.nmfs.noaa.gov/prot]esIPWcoral 
home.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2004). 
76 Oceana, Deep Sea Corals: Out of Sight, But No Longer Out of Mind, 2002 
(hereinafter "Oceana"), available at www.oceana.org/uploadslACF9B.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2004). 
" "Bottom tending mobile fishing gear" includes dredges, beam and otter trawls, 
and other mobile fishing gear that is dragged along the ocean floor. See Effects of 
trawling and dredging on seafloor habitat, National Research Council (2002). 78 [d., and Oceana, supra note 76, at 10. 
79 Freiwald, A Reef-forming cold-water corals, In Wefer, G., D. Billet, D. Heb-
bein, B.B. Jorgensen, M. Schluter, and T. Van Weering, Ocean Margin Systems, 365-
385, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, (eds) 2002. 
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Failure to protect these ancient and slow-growing communities 
is contributing to the world fish crisis and decline of biodiver-
sity.so 
This kind of physical habitat destruction is also exacer-
bated by non-fishing related activities, such as pollution and 
global warming. More than ninety percent of the sewage of 
developing countries is dumped untreated into surface waters."1 
Even treated sewage contains nutrients that encourage algal 
growth that smother and destroy coral and kill fish. It is pre-
dicted that the use of synthetic fertilizers and nitrogen will 
more than double by 2050, and the massive influx of nutrients 
into the marine environment is the likely reason that dead 
zones and poisonous algae blooms have tripled since 1984, 
causing fish kills, beach closures, and the destruction of coral 
reefs. 82 
A recent study also warns that carbon dioxide emissions 
are increasing the acidity of the oceans,83 and harming marine 
organisms.84 Global warming may also be affecting ocean fish 
stocks according to the Environmental Protection Agency: 
Global warming could have many impacts on fish and 
other aquatic species. Some bodies of water may become too 
warm for the fish that currently inhabit those areas; but 
warmer temperatures may also enable fish in cold ocean waters 
to grow more rapidly. Global warming may also change the 
chemical composition of the water that fish inhabit: the amount 
of oxygen in the water may decline, while pollution and salinity 
levels may increase. Loss of wetlands could diminish habitat 
and alter the availability of food for some fish species.85 
so See Simon F. Thrush and Paul K Dayton, Disturbance to Marine Benthic 
Habitats by Trawling and Dredging: Implications for Marine Biodiversity, 33 Annual 
Review of Ecology and Systematics 449-73 (2002). 
81 A Guide to Oceans, Coasts and Islands at the WSSD: Integrated Management 
form Hilltops to Oceans, Biliana Cicin-Sain et aI, Center for the Study of Marine Policy, 
August 16, 2002, at 2 [hereafter "Guide"] 
82 FAO Atlas of the Oceans, supra note 35. 
83 Ken Caldeira and Michael Wickett, Oceanography: Anthropogenic carbon and 
ocean pH, 425 Nature 365 (Sept. 2003). 
84 An important benefit of healthy oceans is the ability to filter carbon dioxide 
from the atmosphere. Office of Water, U.S. EPA, available at www.epa.gov/owow/ 
oceans!> airdep/air2.html; and www.epa.gov/owow/oceans!airdep/air1.html. 
85 U.S. EPA, available at yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf7contentl 
ImpactsFisheries.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2004). It was recently estimated that the 
earth could lose more than one-third its species by the year 2050 as a result of climate 
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III. INADEQUACY OF INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS 
International agreements have called for conservation and 
management measures to address many of these causes of the 
world fish crisis. However, weaknesses inherent in these 
agreements are failing to stem the continuing loss of marine 
biodiversity and world fish stocks. For this reason, the WSSD 
was tasked with developing specific goals, targets, and timeta-
bles to reinvigorate and strengthen international and regional 
agreements, and inspire new international and regional ap-
proaches to address the world fish crisis. We examine the 
strengths and weaknesses of some of these international 
mechanisms below. 
A. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAw OF THE SEAB6 
As noted earlier, from Roman times to the end of World 
War II the dominant legal concept regarding the right to fish 
was the law of capture; i.e., whoever caught it, owned it.a7 Prior 
to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (here-
inafter "UNCLOS"), nations asserted jurisdiction over varying 
amounts of their adjacent ocean waters. But with the conclu-
sion of UNCLOS in 1982 and its entry into force in 1994, a 
comprehensive legal framework was established governing 
ocean jurisdictions, uses, and the obligations of nations. 
UNCLOS resolved conflicting State claims to offshore ju-
risdictions by establishing national twelve-mile "territorial 
seas," twenty-four-mile "contiguous zones," and 200-mile "ex-
clusive economic zones." The area beyond national 200-mile 
EEZs, constituting sixty percent of the world's oceans, are re-
garded as "high seas" under UNCLOS.88 The United States 
initially did not initially sign UNCLOS and has not yet ratified 
change. Chris Thomas, et aI., Extinction risk form climate change, 427 Nature 145 
(January 2004). 
8B U.S. Doc. NCONF.62/122, opened for signature, Dec. 10, 1982, reprinted in 21 
I.L.M. 1261 (hereinafter "UNCLOS"). The Convention and related documents are 
available at www.un.orglDepts/loslconvention_agreementslconvention_agreements.htm 
(last visited March 29,2004). 
a7 R.P. Anand, supra note 7. 
88 UNCLOS, supra note 86, at Articles 2, 3 and 57. 
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it.B9 But President Ronald Reagan proclaimed a 200-mile U.S. 
EEZ in 1983,90 and a twelve-mile territorial sea in 1988 for in-
ternational purposes, which asserts that the United States re-
gards most of the provisions of UNCLOS as customary interna-
tional law. 91 President Clinton declared a twenty-four-mile 
U.S. contiguous zone in 1999.92 
UNCLOS confers within national EEZs "sovereign rights 
for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and 
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living.',"3 
This is significant because "[n]inety percent of the global fish 
catch is taken within zones of national jurisdiction, owing pri-
marily to the higher productivity and proximity of the coastal 
and shelf areas.""' 
The sovereign right to the living resources of the EEZ in-
cludes the exclusive right of coastal nations to manage fisheries 
and a preferential right to harvest fish. National discretion to 
manage and exploit the fishery resources within the EEZ is 
great, but UNCLOS also imposes duties upon coastal States to 
ensure that living marine resources are not over-exploited, 
harvested species are maintained at maximum sustainable 
yield (hereinafter "MSY") , and coastal States consider effects 
on species associated with or dependent upon harvested spe-
89 In 1994, President Clinton transmitted to the Senate the 1982 Convention and 
the 1994 Agreement relating to the Article XI deep seabed provisions, and the package 
was submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Treaty Doc. 103-39). 
But the Senate never gave its advice and consent, and UNCLOS entered into force 
without U.S. accession on November 16, 1994 with the 60th ratification. As of Decem-
ber, 2003, 145 nations have ratified the Convention. CRS Issue Brief for Congress, 
IB95010: The Law of the Sea Convention and U.S. Policy, Marjorie Ann Browne, For-
eign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, February 14, 2001, available at 
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLElCRSreportslO3JunJIB95010.pdf (last visited March 29, 
2004). 
90 Proclamation No. 5030, 3 CFR 22 (1984). 
91 Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg, 777 (1989). The Proclamation declaring a 
12-mile U.S. territorial sea took pains to state that it did not "extend or otherwise alter 
existing Federal or State law" to limit its affect on the application of such U.S. laws as 
the Clean Water Act, the Coastal Zone Management Act and the Submerged Lands Act 
which recognize a 3-mile territorial sea. It did not, however, limit the debate on the 
effect ofthe Proclamation. See for example 1 Territorial Sea Journal 1 (1990). 
92 Proclamation No. 7219,64 Fed. Reg. 48701 (1999). 
93 UNCLOS, supra note 86, at Article 56(1). 
9. The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture, 1998, FAO, Fisheries Depart-
ment available at www.fao.org/docrep/W9900Elw9900e03.htm#P4 (last visited March 
29,2004). 
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cies.95 UNCLOS, however, also requires coastal States to pro-
mote the "optimum utilization" of living resources and allows 
foreign fishing for any "surplus" fish within conservation lim-
its.96 The problem is, as noted by one observer, that UNCLOS, 
"as a practical matter . . . gives to coastal States nearly com-
plete authority to determine unilaterally how to interpret and 
apply these provisions.'>97 
It was thought that extending national EEZ jurisdictions 
to 200 miles would improve the conservation of living marine 
resources.98 This has not, however, proven to be the case, at 
least by the U.S. experience. When the Magnuson Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act was enacted in 1976, the 
U.S. created a 200-mile fishery conservation zone and turned 
over fisheries management to industry dominated management 
councils that merely replaced foreign overfishing with domestic 
overfishing.99 The act of creating national 200-mile jurisdic-
tions for exclusive fisheries management therefore turned out 
to be no guarantee that overfishing, destructive fishing prac-
tices and habitat destruction will be prevented. 
One problem is that fish transverse EEZ's (so called 
"straddling stocks"), mindless of the jurisdictional difficulties 
they create. UNCLOS recognized these inherent difficulties in 
managing fish stocks by calling upon states to "seek ... to agree 
95 UNCLOS, supra note 86, at Article 61. For a discussion of MSY, see infra 
notes 106 and 19-198, and accompanying text. 
96 Id. at Article 62. 
97 Harry Scheiber, Ocean Governance and the Marine Fisheries Crisis: Two Dec-
ades of Innovation - and Frustration, 20 Va. EnvtI. L.J. 119, 126 (2001). 
98 "In the 1980s, it was widely anticipated that fisheries governance would im-
prove substantially in parallel with the establishment of extended national jurisdiction 
under [UNCLOS). This was the case for countries that were able and had the will to 
strengthen their governance. Very often they were already engaged in (EEZ) fisheries 
or had readily available capacity (e.g. trained fishers, investment capital and infra-
structure) within the sector to do so. Subsequent experience has shown that, even 
under the most favourable circumstances, achieving good governance is a protracted 
process." The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture, 1998, FAO, Fisheries Depart-
ment, available at www.fao.org/docrep/W9900E/w9900e03.htm#P4 (last visited March 
29,2004). 
99 Pew Oceans Commission, supra note 12, at 44-45. One-third of assessed U.S. 
fished stocks are officially classified as overfished, and most are still being fished un-
sustainably. Paul Dayton, et aI., Ecological Effects of Fishing in Marine Ecosystems of 
the United States, Pew Oceans Commission, 2002. The status of two-thirds of U.S. fish 
stocks is unknown. National Marine Fisheries Service, Toward Rebuilding American's 
Marine Fisheries, Annual Report to Congress on the Status of U.S. Fisheries, 2001. 
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 2002. 
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upon measures necessary to co-ordinate and ensure the conser-
vation and development of such stocks."'oo A similar duty to 
cooperate "with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting 
the objective of optimum utilization" is imposed upon states 
whose nationals harvest highly migratory fish species that 
cross between the nation's EEZ and "the high seas.101 
UNCLOS reaffirms the right to navigate and fish on the 
high seas.102 It also imposes duties upon all States to take "such 
measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for 
the conservation of the living resources of the high seas,"'oa and 
to cooperate "in the conservation and management of living 
resources" of the high seas. 104 In determining the allowable 
catch and establishing other conservation measures on the 
high seas, UNCLOS asks States to take measures "to maintain 
or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can 
produce maximum sustainable yield.moo 
Although UNCLOS imposes duties upon States to conserve 
fish stocks within and beyond their EEZs, several factors limit 
its effectiveness. First, few if any remedies are available for 
overfishing and destructive fishing practices within EEZs or 
the high seas. States may agree to take measures outside 
UNCLOS' dispute resolution procedures/06 but coastal States 
may reject the submission of disputes to the international tri-
bunal established under UNLOS regarding the living resources 
within their EEZs including the determination of allowable 
catch and harvesting capacity.l07 These provisions provoked the 
observation by the World Bank "that UNCLOS falls signifi-
100 UNCLOS, supra note 86, at Article 63. 
101 [d. at Article 64. 
102 [d. at Article 87. 
loa [d. at Article 117. 
104 [d. at Article 118. 
lOS [d. at Article 119. Articles 119 and 61 ofUNCLOS qualify the term maximum 
sustainable yield ("MSY") "by relevant environmental and economic factors, including 
the special requirements of developing states, and taking into account fishing patterns, 
the interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended international minimum 
standards . . ." Some argue that these qualifications render meaningless the MSY 
provisions of UNCLOS, the WSSD, and other treaties and laws. See infra text accom-
panying notes 195-20l. 
106 [d. at Article 282. 
107 [d. at Article 297(3)(a). 
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cantly short of establishing a truly comprehensive regime of 
compulsory jurisdiction entailing binding decisions."108 
Second, terms like optimum yield (hereinafter "OY") and 
MSY used in the Convention concerning the harvest of fish 
stocks are subject to abuse. 109 OY and MSY failed to prevent 
U.S. and Canadian overfishing of cod off New England and the 
Northwest Atlantic, and the depletion of groundfish in the Pa-
cific. Reliance upon such terms to address drastic overfishing 
by international fleets is a recipe for disaster. 
Third, to the extent that States have developed more 
stringent limits on fishing practices than those in UNCLOS, 
the application of such measures on foreign vessels could be 
challenged before the international tribunal established under 
UNCLOS to resolve disputes or raised as a defense to a prose-
cution for violating more stringent State measures. While the 
latter scenario might be regarded as far-fetched by some, it was 
precisely the defense raised by Royal Caribbean Cruises when 
it was prosecuted by the United States for presenting fabri-
cated oil record books to the United States Coast Guard.110 
Royal Caribbean argued, albeit unsuccessfully, that the right to 
regulate pollution from ships belonged to the flag state (Libe-
ria) under UNCLOS, and not the jurisdiction where the dis-
charge occurred. Although the United States District Court 
disagreed and held that Royal Caribbean could be prosecuted 
under U.S. law, Royal Caribbean illustrates how UNCLOS, 
even before ratification, can be used to attempt to avoid prose-
cution. If and when the U.S. ratifies UNCLOS, such defenses 
could be raised again. III 
Therefore, UNCLOS generally provides a framework for 
addressing the world fish crisis; but it can not by itself prevent 
national overfishing, destructive fishing practices or habitat 
destruction. 
lOB August 4, 2000, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility with respect to 
Southern Bluefin Tuna, World Bank, available at www.worldbank.org! 
icsidibluefintunaiaward080400.pdf (last visited March 29, 2004). 
109 See infra text accompanying notes 195-201. 
110 U.S. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD., 24 F. Supp.2d 155 (D.P.R., 1997) and 
11 F. Supp.2d 1358 (S.D. Florida, 1998). 
III Statement of Roger Rufe, The Ocean Conservancy, Before the Senate Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations, October 21, 2003. 
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B. THE UNITED NATIONS STRADDLING FISH STOCKS TREATY 
In 1995, the United Nations adopted the Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (hereinafter the "Fish Stocks 
Treaty" or "Treaty").112 
As noted earlier, UNCLOS called for future agreements to 
deal with the complex issue of highly migratory species and 
straddling fish stocks in 1982.113 The issue was raised again at 
the 1992 Earth Summit, but was so controversial that agree-
ment could not be reached and a separate United Nations con-
ference was called for; 
States should convene, as soon as possible, an intergovern-
mental conference under United Nations auspices, taking into 
account relevant activities at the subregional, regional and 
global levels, with a view to promoting effective implementa-
tion ofthe provisions of the Untied Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea on straddling fish stocks and highly migratory 
fish stocks. The conference drawing, inter alia, on scientific 
and technical studies by FAO, should identify and assess ex-
isting problems related to the conservation and management 
of such fish stocks, and consider means of improving coopera-
tion on fisheries among States, and formulate appropriate 
recommendations. 114 
A Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migra-
tory Species was convened in 1993, and the United Nations 
Fish Stocks Treaty was adopted on August 4, 1995. The Treaty 
calls upon participating States to, "adopt measures to ensure 
long-term sustainability of straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks and promote the objective of their opti-
mum utilization. "115 Signatory States pledged to minimize 
112 U.N. Doc. NCONF.164/37 (1995), done Sept. 8, 1995, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 
1542 (1995) 9hereafter "Fish Stocks Treaty"] , available at www.un.org/Deptsl 
loslconvention_agreementslconvention_overview _fish_stocks.htm (last visited March 
29,2004). 
113 See supra text accompanying notes 100-102, and UNCLOS, supra note 86, at 
Articles 63 and 64. 
114 UNCED, supra note 3, at Agenda 21, Chapter 17.49(e). 
115 Fish Stocks Treaty, supra note 112, at Article 5(a). 
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waste, discards, and the catch of non-target species,1I6 take 
measures to prevent or eliminate overfishing and excess fishing 
capacity, ensure the sustainable use of fishery resources,ll7 and 
"protect biodiversity in the marine environment."118 
The Treaty compels States to ensure that conservation 
measures are based on the ."best scientific evidence," and con-
tains one of the most comprehensive and progressive expres-
sions of the "precautionary approach" to address the burden of 
proof that guides the setting of total allowable catch (hereinaf-
ter "TAC")."' The precautionary approach provides that States 
"shall be more cautious when information is uncertain, unreli-
able, or inadequate. The absence of adequate scientific infor-
mation shall not be used as a reason for postponing or failing to 
take conservation and management measures. "120 
The Treaty places regional fishery organizations "in a piv-
otal and central position in terms of its implementation; they 
provide the primary mechanism through which participating 
states should cooperate to achieve enhanced resources conser-
vation and management.''''' To address many of the problems 
with UNCLOS compliance and enforcement, the Treaty limits 
access to fishery resources only to States that comply with the 
Treaty's conservation and management measures, or members 
of regional fisheries management organizations. l22 It authorizes 
member States to board and inspect ships suspected of viola-
tions, bring an offending ship into port for serious violations,l23 
and provide evidence to the flag state for prosecution.124 The 
Treaty defers to and incorporates the dispute resolution proce-
dures ofUNCLOS. I25 
The Treaty was passed by consensus, no mean feat in in-
ternational negotiations, and entered into force upon the Thir-
ll6 Id. at Article 5(0. 
117 Id. at Article 5(h). 
118 Id. at Article 5(g). 
II. Id. at Article 5(b) and (c) (j). 
120 Id. at Article 6(2). 
121 The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture, 2002, FAO, Fisheries Depart-
ment, available at www.fao.orgIDOCREP/005N7300Ely7300e05.htm#P157_39938 (last 
visited March 29, 2004). 
122 Fish Stocks Treaty, supra note 112, at Articles 8(4) and 17. 
123 Id. at Article 21(8). 
124 Id. at Articles 20 and 21(4). 
125 Id. at Articles 20(6), and 30. 
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tieth ratification in 2001. The United States, Russia, and Can-
ada ratified the Treaty, but some of the world's largest fishing 
nations have not, including the European Union, China, and 
Japan. 126 The absence of these nations impedes the goals of the 
Treaty to provide for the sustainable management and conser-
vation of highly migratory fish stocks. 
The Fish Stocks Treaty has been touted as "the critical 
breakthrough for a reversal of the trends that are devastating 
the world's fishery resources on the high seas."127 But despite 
its many innovations, the Fish Stocks Treaty has some signifi-
cant limitations. l28 As noted earlier, there is the problem posed 
by the absence of major fishing nations. Language in the 
Treaty also calls for the use of selective fishing gear to avoid 
bycatch, but only "to the extent practicable.'''29 The Treaty also 
shifts the responsibility to the flag states to investigate alleged 
violations, institute and conduct the judicial proceedings, and 
impose penalties on offending ships if it finds that a violation 
occurred. l30 This dependence upon flag states for primary au-
thority over the investigation and sanctioning process means 
that "there will always be a risk that investigations will not be 
thorough or that penalties will not be strong enough. "'31 The 
Treaty's effectiveness therefore suffers limitations similar to 
many other international fishery agreements: 
[I]ts effectiveness will depend on the level of international co-
operation developed, on the capacity and willingness of flag 
states to exercise control over their flag vessels and on the ex-
tent to which subregional and regional organizations and ar-
rangements are adapted or established to carry out the re-
quired conservation and management functions. Ultimately, 
the success of the Agreement will depend on the willingness of 
flag states to contribute equitably to the required reduction in 
126 Kyodo News, January 8, 2002. 
127 Scheiber, supra note 97, at 13l. 
12B Jack Archer, J.H., M.P. Eppling, C.A Biegel, "Sustainable Development: Legal 
Issues and Incentives, (forthcoming, article on file with authors). 
129 Fish Stocks Treaty, supra note 112, at Article 5(0. 
130 Id. at Articles 18(1), 19(1) and (2). 
131 Julie Mack, International Fisheries Management: How the U.N. Conference on 
Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Changes the Law of Fishing on the High 
Seas, 26 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 313,331 (1996). 
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excessive fishing effort which characterizes many high seas 
fisheries. (emphasis added)l32 
C. REGIONAL FISHERY AGREEMENTS 
611 
Numerous international and regional fishery agreements 
(hereinafter "RFA") have been adopted to address the world 
fish crisis. 133 The effectiveness of these agreements, however, 
has been hampered by three major deficiencies: ineffective 
treaty provisions, opt-out and veto provisions, and reliance on 
flag-state enforcement. The ultimate success of the WSSD will 
depend upon whether these deficiencies can be overcome. 
1. Ineffective Treaty Provisions 
Weak and ineffective treaty prOVISIOns in many regional 
fishery agreements have hindered conservation efforts. For 
example, UNCLOS' reliance upon OY and MSY for the conser-
vation of fish stocks is fraught with risk. l34 Similar problems 
have hindered the ability of the International Commission for 
the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (hereinafter "ICCAT") to 
address the dramatic decline of bluefin and other tuna species 
in the Atlantic Ocean. las 
132 The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture, 1996, FAO, available at 
www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3265e1w3265e02.htm#World%20review%200f%20fisheries%2 
Oand%20aquaculture (last visited March 29,2004). 
133 A partial list of regional agreements includes: General Fisheries Council for 
the Mediterranean, Fishery Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic, Indian Ocean 
Fishery Commission, International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the 
North Pacific Ocean, International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, 
Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, Northwest Atlantic Fisher-
ies Organization, Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Re-
sources, North Pacific and Bering Sea Fisheries Advisory Body, North Pacific Anadro-
mous Fish Commission, and North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization. A 
discussion of these and other agreements is beyond the scope of this article. General 
guides to regional fisheries agreements are available at www.fao.org/fil 
body/rfb/chooseman_type.htm and www.oceanlaw.netltextslfisheries (last visited 
March 29,2004). 
134 See supra note 111, and infra text accompanying notes 195-20l. 
135 International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, TIAS 6767, 
20 UST 2887, 673 UNTS 63, May 14, 1966 [hereinafter "ICCAT"l, available at 
www.iccat.es (last visited March 29, 2004). ICCAT members include Algeria, Angola, 
Barbados, Brazil, Canada, China, Croatia, European Community, France Gabon 
Ghana, Guinea, Honduras, Iceland, Ivory Coast, Japan, Korea, Rep. of, Libya, Morocco, 
Mexico, Namibia, Panama, Russia, Sao Tome and Principe, South Africa, Trinidad & 
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ICCAT Commissioners appointed by member States re-
view scientific information on the status of tuna and billfish 
stocks and adopt quotas, size limits, and other management 
measures "to maintain the populations of tuna and tuna like 
fishes that may be taken in the Convention area at levels that 
will maintain maximum sustainable catch.»!36 If a majority of 
member states object to the allocation recommendations they 
do not become effective, and Commission allocations do not ap-
ply within a country's own EEZ.137 
ICCAT has few effective enforcement mechanisms, nor the 
ability to control the fishing activities of non-contracting pari-
ties. l38 It can encourage member and non-member States to 
cooperate, and recommend that members impose "non-
discriminatory" economic sanctions "consistent with their in-
ternational obligations" if it finds that non-members "diminish 
the effectiveness" of the goals of ICCAT.139 World Trade Or-
ganization (hereinafter "WTO") free-trade provisions, however, 
can impede the actual imposition of trade sanctions under 
ICCAT and other international conventions and domestic 
laws. 1.0 
These factors . and the inability to agree on meaningful 
TACs hinder the recovery of severely depleted bluefin tuna 
Tobago, Tunisia, United Kingdom (Bermuda), United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, and 
Venezuela. 
136 Id. at Article VIII. 
137 Id. at Article IX. The United States has enacted a law that prevents its own 
fishery managers from changing ICCAT quotas or allocations, effectively turning over 
management of these species to ICCAT. The Atlantic Tuna Convention Act, 16 U.C.S. 
§§971, et seq. 
138 David Hunter, et aI, International Environmental Law and Policy, University 
Casebook Series Second Edition 2002, at 699. 
139 ICCAT Resolution 94-3 (for tuna) and 95-13 (for swordfish). 
140 Sanctions under ICCAT were authorized against Belize and Honduras and 
Equatorial Guinea for diminishing the effectiveness of ICCAT conservation recommen-
dations on Atlantic swordfish and bluefin tuna. ICCAT Resolutions 95-13 and 94-3. 
But the imposition of trade sanctions may run afoul of the WTO. For example, a WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body ruled that U.S. import restrictions on shrimp from nations 
that did not have programs requiring the use of turtle excluder devices (TEDs) on 
shrimp vessels violated the WTO because the restrictions were applied in an arbitrary 
and discriminatory manner. WTO, Report of the Appellate Body on U.S. - Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, (AB - 1998 -4)(Oct. 12, 1998), 38 
I.L.M. 188 (1999). See also, problems involved with efforts to impose trade sanctions 
under the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna ("CCSBT"). 
CCSBT, Decision Regarding Cambodia, Honduras, and Equatorial Guinea Pursuant to 
the 2000 Action Plan available at www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdfJabout_the_ 
commissionlresolutions_on_the_action_plan.pdf (last visited March 29, 2004). 
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stocks, which remain at ten percent of original biomass. [4[ 
Other stocks have not fared much better.[42 In fact, ICCAT has 
been so ineffective at rebuilding depleted tuna stocks, it is has 
been referred to as the "International Convention to Catch All 
the Tuna. »143 
2. Opt-Out and Veto Provisions 
Some regional fishery agreements allow member nations to 
"opt-out" of or veto critical conservation decisions. For exam-
ple, under the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization 
(hereinafter "NAFO"), [44 the NAFO Fisheries Commission sets 
TACs for member States. [45 But members may unilaterally opt-
out of any allocation by simply giving notice that they will not 
be bound. If one member opts out, none of the other members 
are bound by the allocation schedule. [46 This, of course, gives 
each member State veto power over the entire management 
regime. Unlike the Fish Stocks Treaty's enforcement provi-
sions, NAFO authorizes only the collection of information on 
[4[ West Atlantic bluefin tuna spawning biomass declined from approximately 
50,000 metric tons in 1970 to approximately 3,000 metric tons in 2001. See Figure 
BFT·3, ICCAT Report 2002-2003, www.iccat.es/. 
[42 ICCAT reports that North Atlantic swordfish have recovered to ninety-four 
percent of levels considered healthy over the last three years, but annual yields of 
swordfish are still below MSY. See, www.iccat.es(lastvisitedMarch29.2004).As 
noted in one report, "Swordfish have been so overexploited that large fish are rare and 
most fish that are caught are much younger that the five years at which swordfish 
mature and begin to reproduce themselves. On the high seas, the exploitation of 
sharks is unchecked .... " CMC, supra note 3, at xi. 
[43 The term has been used Carl Safina who, in his book Song for the Blue Ocean, 
describes the difficulties encountered in getting ICCAT members to reduce quotas for 
bluefin tuna in 1992 in the face of strong opposition from Japan and Canada despite 15 
consecutive years of declining stocks and a 90% drop in population estimates. Carl 
Safina, Song for the Blue Ocean, Henry Holt and Co. (1997), at 92-99. 
[44 NAFO was created in 1978 under the Convention on Future Multilateral Co-
operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries to manage groundfish stocks from 
Greenland to North Carolina. NAFO consists of Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Denmark, 
Estonia, European Union, France, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, 
Poland, Russian Federation, Ukraine, and United States of America. Romania with-
drew at the end of 2002. See generally, North Atlantic Fisheries Organization, avail-
able at www.nafo.ca (last visited March 29, 2004). The United States signed the origi-
nal convention in 1978, but legislation implementing the Convention was not enacted 
until the 1995 Fisheries Act. 16 U.S.C. §§5601, et.seq. 
[45 Id. at Article XI, § 4. 
[46 Id. at Article XII, §3. For example, in 1986 NAFO set a TAC for American 
Plaice (flounder) of 700 tons. The EU formally objected and set itself a quota of 21,161 
tons. Hunter, et aI., supra note 138, at 691. 
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fishing activities of non-member states in the Convention 
area. 147 
The Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin 
Tuna (hereinafter "CCSBT")'48 also allows members to veto the 
Convention's conservation measures. The CCSBT requires all 
"[d]ecisions of the Commission to be taken by unanimous vote 
.... " giving each member veto power.149 
3. Reliance on Flag State Enforcement 
Conservation measures, regardless of their strength, are 
useless unless they are effectively enforced. RFAs, however, 
rely primarily upon flag states to enforce treaty violations by 
non-members. Reliance on flag state enforcement is a major 
weakness of international agreements in general and regional 
fishery agreement in particular. 150 The reliance of the Fish 
Stocks Treaty on flag state enforcement was discussed earlier. '5' 
Other Conventions, both regional and worldwide, suffer similar 
weaknesses . 
. For example, NAFO members have reflagged fishing ves-
sels to non-member states to circumvent conservation meas-
ures. '52 Flag state non-enforcement is also hindering the im-
plementation of the 1982 Convention on the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (hereinafter "CCAMLR").'53 
147 Rules of Standing Committee on non-Contracting Parties in the Regulatory 
Area. 
'48 The Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna ("CCSBT") 
available at www.ccsbt.orgldocslpdflabouLthe_commissionlconvention.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2002). CCSBT consists of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Korea, and Taiwan. 
149 Id. at Article 7. 
150 Lack of flag State response to environmental violations of MARPOL was high-
lighted by the General Accounting Office, Progress Made to Reduce Marine Pollution by 
Cruise Ships, but Important Issues Remain, GAOIRCED-00-48, Feb. 28, 2000, at 19-21. 
"Ensuring compliance with environmental agreements is a widely recognized problem." 
GAO, Literature on effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements, 
GAOIRCED-99-148, May 1, 1999. See also, Strengthening the Implementation of Envi-
ronmental Agreements, GAO RCED-92-188, August 1992. 
151 See supra text accompanying notes 132-133. 
152 Office of Marine Conservation, U.S. Department of State, Implementation of 
the Key Provisions of the U.N. Agreement on the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks by Regional Fisheries Man-
agement Organizations and Arrangements, July 1996 at 7 (on file with the authors). 
153 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
("CCAMLR"), 33 UST 3476, TIAS 10240, May 20, 1980, available at www.ccamlr.org 
(last visited March 29, 2004). Parties to CCAMLR are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 
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CCAMLR was developed to protect populations of living organ-
isms inhabiting Antarctic waters. The Convention establishes a 
commission to compile and analyze data on the living marine 
resources of the Antarctic, implement conservation measures to 
ensure that species harvested in the Antarctic do not exceed 
MSY, and consider likely effects of harvest levels on non-target 
species and the marine ecosystem. 154 
Violations of CCAMLR must be referred to the offending 
flag state, which is responsible for imposing sanctions "suffi-
ciently severe as to effectively ensure compliance with 
CCAMLR conservation measures."155 The flag state is supposed 
to "ensure that any of its vessels which have been found to 
have contravened a CCAMLR conservation measure do not 
carry out fishing operations within the Convention Area until 
they have complied with the sanctions imposed.'''56 
Flag state failure to observe CCAMLR TACs is jeopardiz-
ing efforts to conserve rapidly dwindling stocks of severely 
overfished Patagonian toothfish ("Chilean sea bass"). Attempts 
to trace fish in the marketplace through the distribution proc-
ess have been ineffective in stemming illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated fishing.1•7 Under its terms, CCAMLR members are 
only required to comply "within its competence,'''56 relying upon 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, European Community, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Po-
land, Republic Of Korea, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, Uruguay, 
United Kingdom, United States of America, and Vanuatu. 
154 Id. at Article 11(3), available at www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/pubs/bd/pt1.pdf (last 
visited March 29, 2004). 
155 CCAMLR System of Inspection, §XIII, available at www.ccamlr.org/pu/el 
pubs/bd/pt92k.pdf (last visited March 29, 2004). 
156 Id. at §XIV. 
157 R.A. Herr, The International Regulation of Patagonian Toothfish: CCAMLR 
and High Seas Fisheries. Lysaker, FridtjofNansen Institute, 1997, at 11; The State of 
World Fisheries and Aquaculture, 2000, FAO, Fisheries Department, available at 
www.fao.docrep/003/x8002e06.htm#p12 (last visited March 29, 2004), Box 13. 
156 CCAMLR, supra note 155, at Article XXI, paragraph 1. "Each contracting 
party shall take appropriate measures within its competence to ensure compliance 
with the provisions with this Convention and with conservation measures adopted by 
the Commission to which the party is bound in accordance to Article XI of this Conven-
tion." The term "within its competence" is not defined, explained, or even mentioned 
again in the CCAMLR Convention. 
29
Eichenberg and Shapson: The Promise of Johannesburg
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004
616 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
public pressure on offending nations to effectively enforce the 
Convention. 159 
Regional fishery agreements take important steps to track 
fish stocks, gather information on stock size, establish TACs, 
monitor fishing activities, and apply innovative conservation 
principles like the precautionary and ecosystem approaches to 
fisheries management. TACs, however, are often too low to re-
build severely depleted fish stocks and are ignored by member 
and non-member states. Weak enforcement and opt-out provi-
sions thwart enforcement of TACs, and efforts to prevent ille-
gal, unreported and unregulated fishing are not well-
monitored. ISO Regional agreements therefore lack many of the 
prerequisites (noted by FAa below) to prevent the kind of over-
fishing and destructive fishing practices necessary to address 
the world fish crisis: 
The prerequisites for good governance in the fisheries sec-
tor are generally well recognized: the need for a strategy explic-
itly aimed at ecological, economic and social sustainability; ef-
fective fisheries agencies and research institutions (producing, 
inter alia, reliable and up-to-date information on the sector); a 
cooperative, organized and informed fisheries sector; adequate 
laws and legal institutions, including deterrent monitoring, 
control and surveillance (MCS); and linkages with the appro-
priate regional and international bodies. 161 
These are precisely the kinds of prerequisites that the 
WSSD needed to encourage to address the world fish crisis. 
IV. THE WSSD FISHERY PROVISIONS 
A. FROM RIO TO JOHANNESBURG 
The World Summit on Sustainable Development met in 
Johannesburg, South Mrica from August 26 to September 4, 
159 The inability of CCAMLR to stop the IUU fishing for Patagonian Toothfish 
fostered an NGO website by "Isofish" that contains infonnation on boats operating in 
the fishery. See www.isofish.org.au/boatsiindex.htm. 
ISO The U.S. General Accounting Office has found that parties report incomplete 
and late infonnation, and Secretariats do not have adequate authority or resources. 
GAO, "International agreements are not well monitored," GAO/RCED-92.93, Jan. 1992. 
161 The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture, 1998, FAO, Fisheries Depart-
ment, available at www.fao.org/docrep/W9900E/w9900e03.htm#P4 (last visited March 
29,2004). 
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2002, "to reinvigorate the global commitment to sustainable 
development" made at the 1992 Earth Summit.162 The roadmap 
for dealing with the world fish crisis in Johannesburg was well 
laid out in Rio de Janeiro: 
Management of high seas fisheries, including the adoption, 
monitoring and enforcement of effective conservation meas-
ures, is inadequate in many areas and some resources are 
overutilized. There are problems of unregulated fishing, over-
capitalization, excessive fleet size, vessel reflagging to escape 
controls, insufficiently selective gear, unreliable databases 
and lack of sufficient cooperation between states. Action by 
States whose nationals and vessels fish on the high seas, as 
well as cooperation at the bilateral, subregional, regional and 
global levels, is essential particularly for highly migratory 
species and straddling stocks. Such action should address in-
adequacies in fishing practices, as well as in biological knowl-
edge, fisheries statistics and improvement of systems for han-
dling data. Emphasis should also be on multi-species man-
agement and other approaches which take into account the 
relationships among species, especially in addressing depleted 
species, but also in identifying the potential of underutilized 
or unutilized populations. l63 
UNCED Agenda 21 also set forth a series of objectives for 
the sustainable use and conservation of fisheries and living 
marine resources which was to provide the basis for the WSSD 
Plan of Implementation: 
• Maintaining or restoring populations at levels that can 
produce MSY; 
• Promoting the use of selective fishing gear and practices 
to minimize waste and bycatch; 
• Ensuring effective monitoring and enforcement; 
• Protecting and restoring endangered marine species; 
• Preserving habitats and other ecologically sensitive ar-
eas;and 
• Promoting scientific research. l64 
Some progress has been made since these actions were 
proposed in 1992. New regional fishery agreements have been 
162 U.N. GA, 55th Session, Agenda item 95(a), U.N. Doc. AJRES/551199 (2001). 
163 UNCED, supra note 3, at Agenda 21, Chapter 17.45. 
164 
[d. at Agenda 21, Chapter 17.46 and 17.74 
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concluded, coastal and marine programs have been developed, 
and scientific information has been gathered.165 But the "on-
the-ground condition of marine resources and of coastal com-
munities shows alarming declining trends,'''66 and nowhere is 
this decline more apparent than in the condition of world fish 
stocks. This crisis lent a sense of urgency to the gathering in 
Johannesburg in August, 2002. 
The WSSD was a huge international event attended by 
more than 21,000 participants from 191 governments, includ-
ing eighty-two heads of state, thirty vice presidents and deputy 
prime ministers, and seventy-four ministers, royalty and other 
high level officials.167 Many thousands more from all over the 
world converged upon Johannesburg to participate in many of 
the parallel events conducted at locations throughout the city 
simultaneously with the negotiations. 1GB The negotiations pro-
duced two "Type 1 Agreements": The Plan of Implementation, 
and the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Develop-
ment. 160 The Plan of Implementation is a framework for action 
to implement UNCED commitments, and the Declaration out-
lines the path taken from UNCED to the WSSD, highlights 
present challenges and the commitment to sustainable devel-
opment and multilateralism, and emphasizes the need for im-
plementation. l7O 
Also presented at the Summit were so-called "Type 2 Out-
comes." These were various partnerships and commitments 
offered by participating governments, cooperating organiza-
tions, and businesses to strengthen the implementation of 
165 Examples include the 1995 Fish Stocks Treaty, the 1994 Jakarta Mandate of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Respon-
sible Fishing. 
166 Guide, supra note 81, at 4. 
167 Memorandum to Members of the WSSD Informal Committee on Oceans, 
Coasts, and Islands from Biliana Cicin-Sain, Center for the Study of Marine Policy, 
September 14, 2002 [hereinafter "Cicin-Sain Memo,"] (on file with the author). 
1GB Many of these events were held miles from the Stanton Convention Center 
where delegates were debating the merits of the Plan of Implementation and Political 
Declaration leaving some to wonder whether it was a plan to scatter some of the con-
siderable opposition assembled at the Summit bent on demonstrating against global-
ization. The Ubuntu Village, Water Dome and Nasrec were made available to NGOs, 
intergovernmental organizations and civil society that were excluded from the negoti-
ating venue at the Standton Convention Center for "networking," exhibits and events. 
160 WSSD, supra note 1. 
170 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 22, No 51, Sept. 6, 2002. 
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Agenda 21 (the action plan that emanated from the Earth 
Summit).171 A number of these partnership initiatives involved 
oceans, coasts, and islands. For example, the "White Water to 
Blue Water" partnership, led by the United States Department 
of State, was presented to promote integrated coastal and 
ocean ecosystem management programs in 25% of coatal na-
tions by 2015.172 The "Hilltops-2-0ceans" partnership was pre-
sented by the United Nations Environmental Program (herein-
after "UNEP"), Global Programme of Action, and other regional 
intergovernmental organizations to mitigate pollution and re-
source degradation. 173 Some expressed the belief that that the 
Type 2 Outcomes produced some of the most significant gains 
at the World Summit.174 Others characterized as "pure fiction" 
the notion that voluntary actions by global corporations could 
protect the world's natural resources. 175 
B. THE NEGOTIATION 
Four meetings were held prior to Johannesburg in prepa-
ration for the Summit. These "PrepComs" were held in New 
York in April, 2001 (PrepCom I), January, 2002 (PrepCom 11), 
and March, 2003 (PrepCom lID, and in Bali, Indonesia in May, 
2002 (PrepCom IV). 
171 UNCED, supra note 3. 
172 Environmental News Service, Ocean Protection Begins Far Inland, September 
12, 2002, available at www.ens-news.comlenslsep2002l2002-09-03-06.asp (last visited 
March 29, 2004). 
173 See Center for the Study of Marine Policy at the University of Delaware (re-
named to the Gerard J. Mangone Center for Marine Policy), Partnership Initiatives at 
the WSSD, available at www.udel.edu/CMS/csmp/globaloceanslpdf/Approved 
Partnerships. pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2004). 
174 The Type-2 outcomes were touted in a statement by UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan at the conclusion of the Summit. United Nations Release, Johannesburg 
Summit 2002, Sustainable Development Summit Concludes in Johannesburg: UN Sec-
retary-General Ko/i Annan Says It's Just the Beginning, September 4,2002. U.S. Sec-
retary of State Collin Powell also invited nations to join in the 15 Partnerships that the 
U.S. brought to the table. As Delivered Remarks by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell 
at the WSSD, September 4, 2002. 
175 Carl Pope, Sierra Club, quoted in Robert Collier, Strong Bay presence at Earth 
Summit: Challenge to U.S. contingent even greater than 10 years ago, San Francisco 
Chronicle, August 24, 2002, at A6. A joint statement by civil society organizations in 
Asia, Latin American and Africa expressed concern that "misplaced emphasis on these 
so-called Type-2 outcomes may serve to mask the failure of governments to make bind-
ing commitments within a global framework, the so-called Type-1 outcomes." Eco-
Equity, Issue 7, September 3,2002. 
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Incredibly, the initial negotiating text of the Plan of Im-
plementation did not contain a section on the oceans despite 
the fact that oceans comprise more than seventy percent of the 
earth's surface and make life possible on this planet, and that 
seventy-five percent of the world's fish stocks require urgent 
action to ensure that fish can continue to be harvested sustain-
ably. 176 Instead, the agenda focused on a host of other critically 
important and controversial issues including sanitation, re-
newable energy, agriculture, chemicals and health, natural 
resource degradation, biodiversity loss, Rio Principles 7 (com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities) and 15 (the precaution-
ary approach), governance, trade, finance, globalization, the 
Kyoto Protocol and climate change, health, and human rights.177 
Oceans, coasts, and island issues were forced onto para-
graphs twenty-nine through thirty-four and fifty-two through 
fifty-five of the negotiating text during the PrepComs through 
the determined efforts of nongovernmental organizations like 
Oceana, the Wildlife Conservation Society, and the Center for 
the Study of Marine Policy, interested governments including 
the U.S., Chile, and Australia, and intergovernmental organi-
zations including UNEP and UNESCO.178 
Even so, the text delivered to Johannesburg was littered 
with bracketed language where agreements could not be 
reached on critical goals, targets, and timetables with respect 
to ocean issues.179 There also was a decided lack of consensus 
on other key elements of the Plan, particularly with respect to 
energy, trade, finance, and globalization. ISO In fact, delegates 
arrived in Johannesburg with more than 400 points of dis-
agreement in the Plan of Implementation and had not even 
begun to discuss the Political Declaration. lSI Notwithstanding 
these difficulties, by the end of the Summit ocean issues were 
176 FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2000 (2001). 
177 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, supra note 170. 
)78 Telephone conversation with WSSD participant Jorge Varela, Oceana, Santi· 
ago, Chile (January 19, 2004). 
)79 The bracketed language has been preserved by the Center for the Study of 
Marine Policy. Guide, supra note 81, at 10-14. 
ISO Earth Negotiations Bulletin, supra note 170. 
18) Independent News, They came. They talked. And weasled. And left., September 
8,2002. 
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considered to be one of the most significant outcomes of the 
WSSD.182 
One of the biggest challenges at the WSSD was to execute 
with specific targets and timetables the broad policy goals out-
lined in Agenda 21 at the 1992 Earth Summit. This effort was 
made considerably more difficult by the U.S. negotiating pos-
ture to consistently oppose specific targets, dates, timetables, 
and emerging principles of international environmental law, 
regardless of the issue. The U.S position purportedly was 
based upon ideological grounds and lack of sufficient science. 183 
For example, during the negotiations in Johannesburg the 
United States opposed: 
1. A target date of 2015 for reversing the current trend in 
resource degradation; 
2. A target date of 2015 for maintaining or restoring de-
pleted fish stocks to levels producing MSY (Par. 30(a». The 
target was qualified in the final text by the phrase "where pos-
sible"; 
3. A target date of 2010 for increasing the global use of re-
newable energy by 15% (Par. 19(e». The target date was re-
placed in the final text by the phrase "with a sense of urgency, 
substantially increase the global share of renewable energy 
sources"· , 
182 Cicin-Sain Memo, supra note 167. The oceans agenda was pushed by an in-
formal WSSD Coordinating Group on Oceans, Coasts and Islands formed prior to the 
Summit consisting of 44 individuals from nongovernmental organizations, govern-
ments, and intergovernmental and international organizations ("The Group"). The 
Group, led by the Center for the Study of Marine Policy, produced a "Guide to Oceans, 
Coasts, and Islands at the WSSD," supra note 81, distributed 3,000 copies at the Sum-
mit, held four coordination/discussion meetings during the Summit, convened a meet-
ing on "Bringing Synergy Among Type II Initiatives on Oceans, Coasts and Islands" on 
August 30, conducted a high-level event on "People, Oceans, and Stewardship" on Sep-
tember 2 highlighting achievements on oceans and announcing new Type II partner-
ships, and held two press conference commenting on WSSD outcomes. The Group held 
a global conference on Oceans, Coasts and Islands to review WSSD implementation 
and related issues at the UNESCO in Paris in November 2003. 
183 The United States' positions were reported in the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 
supra note 170, and by participants in the negotiation. 
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4. A target date of 2015 for reducing by half the number of 
people lacking access to safe drinking water and adequate sani-
tation (Par. 7). The U.S. dropped its opposition after the tar-
gets for renewable energy were removed; 
5. Inviting states to ratify and "fully" implement UNCLOS 
(Par. 29(a». The word "fully" was deleted in the final text; 
6. Language urging all countries to ratify the Kyoto Proto-
col to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (Par. 36). The final text was modified to provide that 
"States that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol strongly urge 
States that have not already done so to ratify ... in a timely 
manner'" , 
7. Use of the term "precautionary principle," and applying 
precaution to health issues rather than environmental deci-
sion-making. The final text uses the less prescriptive term 
"precautionary approach" used in Rio Principle 15; and, 
8. Use of the concept "common but differentiated responsi-
bilities" in Rio Principle 7 with respect to differing national 
contributions to global environmental degradation. Modifica-
tions in the final text were made to address U.S. concerns.'84 
There was considerable consternation on these and other 
U.S. positions. U.S. support for a proposal giving the World 
Trade Organization the power to override international envi-
ronmental agreements was especially resented, even after it 
was defeated. '8s The U.S. alliance with OPEC nations, Japan 
184 The official U.S. explanation for its position on "common but differentiated 
responsibilities" was that "The U.S. does not accept any interpretation of principle 7 
that would imply a recognition or acceptance by the U.S. of any international obliga-
tions or liabilities, or any diminution of the responsibilities of developing countries 
under international law." Explanation of Position by the United States of America 
Submitted for the Record for Inclusion in the Report of the Conference of the WSSD, 
September 4, 2002. 
185 Independent News, supra note 181. Governments finally agreed to remove the 
language on WTO consistency from paragraph 17 after a long and hard battle, and an 
impassioned plea by Tewolde Egziabher, the delegate from Ethiopia. [d. The final text 
was revised to provide that nations will "continue to enhance the mutual supportive-
ness of trade, environment and development," omitting a clause which would have 
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and Canada in opposing firm timetables for reducing oil and 
gas consumption was called "an axis of oil. m88 There was also 
disappointment that President Bush did not attend the WSSD, 
especially since his father's visit to Rio in 1992 contributed to 
the success of the Earth Summit and, at the time, elevated 
America's prestige in the international community. 
Instead, the U.S. sent to Johannesburg one of the most 
popular and sympathetic members of the Bush Administration 
to address the Summit during the final plenary session, Secre-
tary of State Colin Powell. By then, however, the damage was 
done to many of the proposed targets and timetables in the 
P~n. ~ 
Secretary Powell had an uphill battle to repair the damage 
caused by the U.S. negotiating position. The Secretary's speech 
was poorly received after he plugged U.S. genetically modified 
corn, which several Mrican governments had rejected, and 
touted U.S. "action to meet environmental challenges, includ-
ing global climate change, not just rhetoric," in spite of U.S. 
efforts to weaken the language on ratification of the Kyoto Pro-
tocols. 187 Secretary Powell's speech was interrupted with boos 
and jeers, as frustrated delegates and activists were physically 
removed from the building and their credentials withdrawn. 
As the Summit concluded, the United States issued a for-
mal statement rejecting international aid targets based upon 
percentages of gross national product and noting that, while 
the WSSD Plan of Implementation and Declaration was impor-
tant, it "did not create legally binding obligations on States un-
der international law.mss The failure to agree on specific tar-
gets and timetables on many key issues led to one press report 
that in Johannesburg, "They came. They talked. And Weasled. 
And left.'''89 
added, "while ensuring WTP consistency." BBC News, Summit Conclusions at a 
Glance, September 4,2002. 
ISS James Dao, Protesters Interrupt Powell Speech as U.N. Talks End, N.Y. Times, 
September 5, 2002 at AIO. 
187 Re b marks y Secretary Powell, supra note 174. 
ISS Explanation of Position by the U.S., supra note 184. 
189 I d ndepen ent News, supra note 181. 
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C. KEy FISHERY PROVISIONS OF THE WSSD PLAN OF 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Despite these and other disappointments, the United Na-
tions proclaimed that the WSSD made "significant commit-
ments to improve the lives of people living in poverty and to 
reverse the continuing degradation of the global environment," 
highlighting more than 200 Type 2 Partnerships, representing 
$235 million in resources, to complement governmental com-
mitments. l90 Secretary Powell announced that the Bush Ad-
ministration would request an increase of $5 billion per year 
for three years in federal development assistance and build 
90,000 houses in South Mrica.191 
Reports on the Summit reserved special praise for the pro-
visions on oceans and fisheries. 192 These provisions and their 
effect on the world fish crisis are examined below: 
1. Produce Maximum Sustainable Yield by 2015 
• Paragraph 30(a): Maintain or restore fish stocks to levels 
that can produce the maximum sustainable yield with the 
aim of achieving these goals on an urgent basis and where 
possible not later than 2015. 
Creating a target for maintaining or restoring world fish 
stocks to maximum sustainable yield by 2015 was a hard 
fought battle, and touted as one of the major accomplishments 
of the Summit (notwithstanding the last minute insertion of 
the term "where possible" at the insistence of the U.S.). The 
concept of MSY recognizes that fisheries must be managed so 
that fish stocks can be sustainably caught year after year with-
out causing the population of fish stocks to decline. 193 Achieving 
MSY "on an urgent basis" establishes an important goal to re-
store depleted fish populations, although it is difficult to recon-
190 UN Release, supra note 174. 
191 Remarks of Secretary Powell, supra note 174. 
192 One observer noting the relatively strong provisions on fisheries said the 
Summit was "good news if you don't have a toilet or if you're a fish. Otherwise, it's 
nothing." Danna Harmon, Amid protests, summit ends, The Christian Science Monitor, 
September 5, 2002. 
193 50 CFR 602. l1(d)(1). 
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cile the urgency expressed in the text with a target date that 
extends for more than a decade. 
MSY is an imperfect tool that has been used under the 
Magnuson-Stevens Act19' to justify delaying action to close fish-
eries or reduce TACs for short-term economic impacts on the 
fishing industry.'9' Consequently, MSY as a management goal 
is being reevaluated by scientists. 
Fishing rates that would give the theoretical MSY were once 
considered a good target, but there has been a stampede away 
from this objective - fishing mortality should not exceed the 
theoretical point at which MSY would be achieved and stock 
biomass (population levels) should not drop below the MSY 
level. (emphasis added)l96 
Scientists assume that population levels at 40% of un-
fished abundance (or biomass) are close to MSY, and that popu-
lations are overfished when levels fall below half the MSY 
level, roughly twenty percent of unfished abundance. The les-
son of U.S. fisheries management, where forty percent of the 
fish populations assessed are at less than twenty percent of 
abundance levels, is that MSY does not signify healthy fish 
populations, especially for slow growing species like sharks, 
Pacific rockfish and groupers. Fish populations at twenty-one 
percent of abundance are far from healthy and can not safely 
be considered to be "not overfished.'''97 
MSY is also considered on a fishery specific basis, making 
difficult application of the ecosystem approach to fisheries 
management. (The ecosystem approach is discussed in more 
detail below.) 
MSY as fishery management tool should therefore be 
viewed as a minimum target,198 and used in conjunction with 
precautionary and ecosystem approaches to restore depleted 
fish stocks and protect robust stocks. Setting precautionary 
targets means taking into account the reproductive capacity 
194 16 u.s.c. §§1801, et seq. 
19. New England Groundfish, supra note 21. 
196 Simon Jennings, et ai., Marine Fisheries Ecology, (Blackwell Science Inc. 
2001). 
197 Michael F. Hirshfield, Looking Below the Surface: How Healthy are America's 
Ocean Fisheries?, Oceana (2003). 
198 Fish Stocks Treaty, supra note 112, at Annex II, par. 7. 
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and the resilience of each stock, the characteristics of fisheries 
exploiting the stock, other sources of mortality, uncertainty, 
minimizing the impact of fishing activities on non-target spe-
cies, and protecting biodiversity and habitats of special con-
cern. I99 This is especially true of fish stocks below MSY abun-
dance levels. There is also a real danger that MSY can be used 
to reduce healthy fish stocks. That said, there is also a benefit 
for creating a target date to bring depleted stocks up to MSY 
levels, and to promote the use of other management tools in 
conjunction with MSY to protect healthy stocks, such as the 
precautionary and ecosystem approach, marine protected ar-
eas, and measures to control destructive fishing practices. 
2. Apply the Ecosystem Approach by 2010 
• Paragraph 29(d): Encourage the application by 2010 of the 
ecosystem approach; 
• Paragraph 3l(c): Develop and facilitate the use of diverse 
approaches and tools, including the ecosystem approach ... 
Paragraphs 29(d) establishes a target date of 2010 for ap-
plying the ecosystem approach, echoing similar language 
adopted at the 2001 Reykjavik Declaration on Responsible 
Fisheries and decision 5/6 the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity (hereinafter "CBD").200 Article 2 of the CBD defines "eco-
system" as "a dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro-
organism communities, and their non-living environment in-
teracting as a functional unit."201 The ecosystem approach is "a 
strategy for the integrated management of land, water, and 
199 [d. at Annex 11.3, Articles 5(0, 5(g), 6.3. 
200 Conference on Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem, Reykjavik, 
Iceland, 1-4 October 2001, The Reykjavik Declaration on Responsible Fisheries, avail-
able at http://eelink.neU-asilwildlife/RespFish.html (last visited March 29, 2004).; The 
Convention on Biological Diversity [hereafter "CBD"], available at www.biodiv.org! 
convention/articles. asp (last visited March 29, 2004).. The CBD was signed by nearly 
every country except the United States at UNCED, and entered into force just eighteen 
months later in 1993. Although President Clinton signed the Convention shortly after 
taking office in 1993, the Senate has not yet provided its advice and consent. 
201 CBD, [d. at Article 2. 
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living resources that promotes conservation and sustainability 
in an equitable way.'>202 
As applied to fisheries management, the ecosystem ap-
proach avoids the pitfalls of single species management utilized 
by many international conventions and regional fishery agree-
ments!oa The ecosystem approach reinforces the use of precau-
tion and the protection of biodiversity, because it requires at-
tention to the full range of the effects of fishing on the entire 
ocean ecosystem, rather than just the fishery managed. It re-
quires consideration of the effects of removing species on the 
entire ocean ecosystem, be it predator - prey relationships, 
changes in trophic levels of species,204 effects on habitats from 
fishing gear, and/or the ecosystem effects of bycatch. This in 
turn requires better monitoring, research, and ecosystem mod-
eling, exactly the kind of scientific commitment needed to ad-
dress the world fish crisis. 
Despite the importance of the ecosystem approach to sus-
tainable fisheries, the text of paragraph 29(d) merely "encour-
ages" the application of the ecosystem approach by 2010, and 
paragraph 31(c) contains neither a target nor a prescription for 
implementing the ecosystem approach. More definitive lan-
guage for applying this important concept in managing fisher-
ies was unable to be agreed upon in the text. 
3. Eliminate Destructive Fishing Practices 
• Paragraph 31(c): Develop and facilitate the use of diverse 
approaches and tools, including ... the elimination of destruc-
tive fishing practices ... 
The world fish crisis can not be addressed meaningfully 
unless destructive fishing practices are eliminated for all the 
202 Decision 5/6, Conference of the Parties, CBD, available at 
www.biodiv.org/decisions/ (last visited Mar. 26,2004). 
203 Dayton, supra note 72. 
204 An example of how overfishing can affect tropic levels is "fishing down the food 
web" whereby overfishing of top-trophic species, like tuna and swordfish, salmon and 
sharks, leads to the development of fisheries for lower-trophic species in the food web, 
removing the natural benefits of biodiversity and leading to unpredictable changes 
such as increased disease outbreaks, the proliferation of pests, and increase in lower 
trophic species which may hinder the recovery of depleted populations. Pauly, et a!., 
supra note 69. 
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reasons described earlier in this article.205 It is therefore com-
mendable that paragraph 31(c) calls for the "elimination of de-
structive fishing practices." But without targets and timetable 
to end these devastating and wasteful activities, the policy does 
little but repeat similar entreaties in other international 
agreements. 
4. Establish Marine Protected Areas by 2012 
• Paragraph 31(c): Develop and facilitate the use of diverse 
approaches and tools, including ... the establishment of ma-
rine protected areas consistent with international law and 
based on scientific information, including representative net-
works by 2012 and time/area closures for the protection of 
nursery grounds ... 
Marine protected areas (hereinafter "MP As") are an impor-
tant tool for protecting marine ecosystems and the fish upon 
which they depend. But MPA is a generic term that can refer 
to any area of managed marine habitat, including marine re-
serves, marine sanctuaries, refuges, or parks. Some MPAs may 
have little or nothing to do with fisheries. For example, the 
U.S. national marine sanctuaries program provides authority 
for the "comprehensive and coordinated conservation and man-
agement" of areas of the marine environment "of special na-
tional significance.'1206 It facilitates "all public and private uses" 
compatible with resources protection.207 Although sanctuaries 
were not originally established to protect fisheries, in the past 
several years there has been a growing movement to set aside 
small portions of these special areas as no-take fish reserves.208 
Areas in which no extractive uses are allowed are gener-
ally referred to as "fully protected marine reserves." Only a 
small fraction of one percent of the world's oceans is fully pro-
205 See supra text accompanying notes 58-74. 
206 16 USC §1433(a)(3). 
207 16 USC §1433(b)(5). 
208 Two no-take reserves were established in 1997 and 2001 in the Florida Keys 
National Marine Sanctuary totaling 212 square miles, and a 132 square mile area 
within state waters was set aside in the Channel Islands National Marine Sanctuary in 
2003. Other areas within the federal portion of the Channel Islands Sanctuary area 
also under consideration. Stephen R. Palumbi, Marine Reserves: A Tool for Ecosystem 
Management and Conservation, Prepared for the Pew Oceans Commission, 2002, at 2-
5. 
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tected marine reserves.209 The U.S. has only about 24 fully pro-
tected marine reserves, consisting of .03% of its ocean terri-
tory:1O By comparison, there are tens of thousands of terres-
trial parks throughout the country and the world, protecting 
about four percent of the earth's land resources.211 
Marine reserves protect remaining biodiversity and allow 
depleted marine species and habitats to recover within their 
boundaries.212 There is growing scientific evidence that marine 
reserves also enhance fish populations. As fish grow larger, 
they generate more larvae and more juvenile fish spillover out-
side the reserves and replenish the broader ecosystem.213 Re-
serves enhance marine ecosystems, increase the size and num-
bers of heavily exploited species, increase fish densities within 
reserves as much as sixty to 150 percent, and increase popula-
tions of other commercially valuable benthic organisms:14 
Thus, the target established in paragraph 31(c) for devel-
oping and facilitating MPAs, including representative networks 
by 2012, is significant, even in the absence of a specific call for 
marine reserves which are likely to be more effective in restor-
ing depleted fish stocks. 
5. Reduce the Loss of Biological Diversity by 2010 
• Paragraph 42: [T]he achievement by 2010 of a significant 
reduction in the current rate ofloss of biological diversity ... 
209 National Research Council, Marine Protected Areas: Tools for Sustaining 
Ocean Ecosystems, National Academy Press, 2001; Center for Marine Conservation, 
Health of the Oceans, (2002), at 58. 
210 Palumbi, supra note 208, at 2-5. 
211 Rod Fujita of Environmental Defense attributes this to "a double standard ... 
in environmental policy. Fishery managers had no problem allowing large scale fishing 
to start and continue right on through the collapse of the West Coast groundfishery, on 
the basis of very limited scientific understanding of the life history and productivity of 
the fish populations they were exploiting. But the same fishery managers demand a 
very high degree of scientific certainty for the common-sense idea of setting some fish 
aside in case of mistakes. Rod Fujita, Heal the Ocean, New Society Publishers (2003), 
at 35. 
212 [d. at 37. 
213 [d. at 36. See also The Science of Marine Reserves, Partnership for Interdisci-
plinary Studies of Coastal Oceans, 2002 citing examples in Florida (Merritt Island), 
and New England (Georges Bank) at 10-11. 
214 For example, scallops flourished within the areas closed to protect Atlantic cod 
populations in New England. Palumbi, supra note 208, at 22-25. 
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The alarming loss of biological diversity throughout the 
world is having significant adverse impacts on the world's 
natural resources, including fish stocks.215 Paragraph 42 reiter-
ates the target set at the Ministerial Declaration at the 6th Con-
ference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at 
the Hague in April 2002, which called "upon the WSSD to ... 
reconfirm the commitment to have instruments in place to stop 
and reverse the current alarming biodiversity loss at the 
global, regional, subregional, and national levels by the year 
2010" (emphasis added)."· 
According to an observer at the Summit, "the WSSD con-
sidered but ultimately failed to reaffirm the commitment" to 
have instruments in place to stop and reverse biodiversity loss 
by 2010:'7 Instead, the text generally calls upon States to 
"promote" or "encourage" measures to curb biodiversity loss. 
The language of paragraph 42, although a retreat, should not 
be viewed as negating the validity of the Hague commitment.218 
6. Eliminate Fishing Subsidies 
• Paragraph 30(£): Eliminate subsidies that contribute to il-
legal, unreported and unregulated fishing and over-capacity, 
while completing efforts undertaken at WTO to clarify and 
improve its disciplines on fisheries subsidies, taking into ac-
count the importance of this sector to developing countries. 
Even without a target date, this provision strengthens the 
broad agreement among nations at the WTO Ministerial meet-
ing in Doha, Qatar, November, 2001 to address the important 
215 According to E.O Wilson, 27,000 species go extinct each year, seventy-four per 
day, three per hour, and twenty per cent of all species could become extinct by the year 
2020. E.O. Wilson, The Diversity of Life, (W.W. Norton and Company 1992), at 280. 
See also, Global Marine Biological Diversity, supra note 11, at 90, "[M]aintaining bio-
logical diversity goes beyond preventing extinctions to maintaining the abundance of 
species and the functioning of ecosystems, including the production of exploitable popu-
lations." 
216 Paragraph 15, 6th Conference of the Parties, United Nations Convention on 
Biological Diversity, April 2002. 
217 Comments of Mathew Gianni, Greenpeace International, October 2, 2002, 
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issue of fishing subsides!19 Fishing subsidies contribute to the 
world fish crisis by creating excess fishing capacity and distort-
ing international markets, leading to overfishing, destructive 
fishing practices, and illegal, unreported and unregulated fish-
ing.220 
But not all fishing subsidies are harmful. Subsidies can be 
used to help acquire sustainable fishing gear, enhance commu-
nity-based small-scale fishing operations, provide vessel moni-
toring systems to track fishing activities, help phase out de-
structive fishing practices, and improve monitoring and report-
ing of catch. These kinds of subsidies benefit world fish stocks 
and should be preserved. On the other hand, subsidies to dis-
tant water factory trawlers that exploit vulnerable high seas 
fisheries, joint ventures that export fishing capacity (such as 
currently exists between the European Union and Argentina), 
and subsidies that expand or maintain oversized fleets harm 
world fish stocks and need to end. 
The WTO is the key to eliminating harmful subsides and 
has agreed to develop rules to address fishing subsidies at its 
January, 2005 meeting. Nongovernmental organizations like 
Oceana, Center for International Environmental Law, and the 
World Wildlife Fund, working with the "friends of fish" nations 
(United States, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Peru, Ecuador 
and the Philippines), ensured the survival of the subsidy issue 
through the otherwise disastrous WTO Ministerial in Cancun, 
Mexico in August, 2003.221 The WSSD provisions will help keep 
the pressure on the WTO to resolve this important issue. 
219 Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration, WTIMIN(Ol)IDEC/1, 
Par. 28 (WTO, November 2001) 
220 World Wildlife Fund, Turning the Tide on Fishing Subsidies: Can the World 
Trade Organization Play a Positive Role? 2002, at 4. available at 
www. panda.org/downloads/policy/turnin~tide_on_fishin~subsidies. pdf (last visited 
March 29, 2004). Subsidies played a significant role in the collapse of the hake fishery 
in Argentina in 1997, and brought cod to the verge of extinction in the North Atlantic. 
See also, NRC, supra note 35. The target date to develop and implement an interna-
tional plan of action to prevent illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing by 2004 
under paragraph 30(d) will also help to eliminate fishing subsidies since there is such a 
close relationship between subsidies, increased fishing capacity and illegal fishing. 
221 Telephone conversation with WSSD participant Jorge Varela, Oceana, Santi-
ago, Chile, Jan. 19, 2004. 
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7. Implementing Plans to Manage Fishing Capacity by 2005 
and Eliminate IUU Fishing by 2004 
• Paragraph 30(d): Urgently develop and implement na-
tional and, where appropriate, regional plans of action, to put 
into effect the F AO international plans of action, in particular 
the international plan for the management of fishing capacity 
by 2005 and the international plan of action to prevent, deter 
and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing by 
2004. 
Excess fishing capacity, fostered by subsidies and poor 
fisheries management, deplete available resources and create 
the tragedy of the commons where too many boats chase too 
few fish. A growing number of fishing vessels also circumvent 
national laws and regional fishing agreements by targeting 
high value fish stocks, and fail to report their catch properly. 
IUD fishing is also believed to be responsible for the fact that 
only forty percent of the catch of the severely overfished Pata-
gonian toothfish is reported.222 
IUD fishing vessels are also more likely to use unsustain-
able fishing practices and thereby exacerbate waste and by-
catch. IUD fishing killed 50,000 to 89,000 seabirds in the 
CCAMLR region in 1998, compared to 1,562 birds killed by le-
gally conducted fishing activities.223 
For these reasons IUD fishing is "one of the most severe 
problems currently affecting world fisheries. m2' To address 
IUD fishing meaningfully, States must effectively control ves-
sels flying their flags, port States must undertake vigorous in-
vestigations, and the trade in species captured from IUD fish-
ing must be halted. 
Creating target dates to "urgently develop and implement" 
action plans to manage fishing capacity by 2005, and prevent, 
deter and eliminate IUD fishing by 2004 establishes an impor-
tant international commitment, even if the dates may be unre-
222 Herr, supra note 157, at II. 
223 Report of the Secretary-General on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. 
N541429 and Corr. 1, par. 252. 
22. Oceans and Law of the Seas: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GA, 55th 
Session at 26, U.N. Doc N55/61 (2000); See also FAO International Plan of Action to 
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, available 
at www.fao.org/filipalipae.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2004). 
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alistic. The WSSD calls upon the parties to UNCLOS, the Fish 
Stocks Treaty, and other agreements to aggressively imple-
ment and enforce the mandates of those treaties, the F AO Code 
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and the FAO Interna-
tional Plan of Action on excess capacity and IUD fishing. Vigi-
lance of the parties, regional organizations, nongovernmental 
organizations and concerned citizens will be necessary to en-
sure that these agreements and action plans are vigorously 
implemented and enforced. 
8. Implement International Treaties and Agreements 
• Paragraph 29(a): Invite States to ratify or accede to and 
implement [UNCLOS]; 
• Paragraph 30(b): Ratify or accede to and effectively im-
plement the relevant UN and, where appropriate, associated 
regional fisheries agreements or arrangements, noting in par-
ticular the [UN Fish Stocks Treaty]; 
• Paragraph 30(c): Implement the 1995 Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries; 
While these provisions lack targets and timetables, they 
encourage nations to use the tools provided in UNCLOS, the 
Fish Stocks Treaty and the F AO Code of Conduct to reduce de-
structive fishing practices and help rebuild depleted fish 
stocks. Some of the tools and general principles provided in 
these agreements that are especially helpful include duties to 
conserve living marine resources on the high seas, EEZs and 
straddling stocks, utilizing precautionary and ecosystem ap-
proaches, and adopting measures to prevent overfishing and 
excess fishing capacity.225 
The F AO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries is a 
non-binding instrument adopted in 1995 to support ecologically 
responsible fishing. 226 It provides guidelines for fisheries opera-
tions, gear, methods and management systems, and calls on 
governments to use the precautionary approach, reduce de-
225 See supra text accompanying notes 114-134. 
226 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries [hereafter "FAO Code of Con-
duct"], available at www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/v9878e1v9878e00.htm#9 (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2004). 
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structive fishing technologies, and end extremely destructive 
activities such as the use of poison and explosives.227 To the 
extent that nations fulfill their WSSD commitments, these pro-
visions will reinforce non-binding instruments like the FAD 
Code of Conduct, and extend the conservation obligations in 
UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks Treaty to nations that have not 
ratified these agreements. 
9. Supporting Sustainable Aquaculture 
• Paragraph 30(h): Support the sustainable development of 
aquaculture, including small-scale aquaculture, given its 
growing importance for food security and economic develop-
ment. 
Marine finfish aquaculture operations can impact fish 
stocks and ocean ecosystems in a number of ways. 228 Diseases 
like infectious salmon anemia and sea lice can be transmitted 
from farmed to wild fish stocks:29 Fish wastes and the use 
chemicals, pesticides and antibiotics to combat disease can im-
pair marine water quality.= Farmed non-native fish species 
can escape and compete with and genetically alter wild fish 
stocks.231 The use of fish meal to feed farmed species can affect 
227 Id. at Article 6. 
228 See National Research Council, Marine Aquaculture: Opportunities for Growth 
(1992) at 92-110; Biliana Cicin-Sain, et aI., Development of a Policy Framework for 
Offshore Marine Aquaculture in the 3·200 Mile U.S. Ocean Zone, Center for the Study 
of Marine Policy July 2001, available at http://darc.cms.udel.edulsgeezlsgeezl.html 
(last visited March 29, 2004); and Pew Oceans Commission, Marine Aquaculture in the 
United States (2002). 
229 More than one million farmed salmon were destroyed in Maine in 2002 to 
prevent the spread of infectious salmon anemia. Max Huber, Maine orders slaughter of 
farm-raised salmon, Outdoor-Links. Com, January 9, 2002. See also, Journal of the 
American Veterinary Medical Association, Infectious salmon anemia emergency de-
clared by USDA, February 15, 2002. 
230 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Aquaculture Waste Disposal 
Wells, Sept., 1999, pg. 12, www.epa.gov/safewater/uiclclassv/pdfslvolumell.pdf. Ap-
proximately 400,000 pounds of antibiotics are used annually in the production of sea-
food sold in the U.S. Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, Widespread Antibiotic 
Drug Use in the U.S. Aquaculture, New Report Finds, (Press Release Mar. 21, 2002) 
available at www.iatp.org (last visited March 29,2004). 
231 ICES, Code of Practice on the Introductions and Transfers of Marine Organ-
isms, 2003, available at www.ices.dklreportsigeneraV2003/Codemarine 
introductions2003.pdf (last visited March 29, 2004). Rosamond Naylor, et aI, Aquacul-
ture-A Gateway for Exotic Species, 294 Science,1655-1656 (November 23, 2001). The 
introduction of genetically altered fish have been banned in California and Washington 
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marine ecosystems,232 and chemicals in farmed fish are a grow-
ing health concern!"" 
Binding agreements, with targets and timetables, are 
needed to apply stringent environmental standards to new and 
existing aquaculture operations. Simply "supporting" sustain-
able aquaculture, as provided in paragraph 30(h), does not go 
far enough to address the threats to ocean ecosystems and wild 
fish stocks throughout the world. Nor does this provision rec-
ognize the potential impacts of existing marine aquaculture 
operations which are growing rapidly and already provide one-
third of the world's seafood. 234 
Paragraph 31(c) of the text does call for implementing the 
1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries:35 The Code of 
Conduct calls on States to evaluate the effects of aquaculture 
development on genetic diversity and ecosystem integrity,236 
and consult with neighboring States before introducing non-
indigenous species into transboundary aquatic ecosystems.237 
The Code also requires States to ensure that "that the disposal 
of wastes such as offal, sludge, dead or diseased fish, excess 
veterinary drugs and other hazardous chemical inputs does not 
constitute a hazard to human health and the environment.'>238 
These provisions in the F AO Code of Conduct are helpful, 
but do not go far enough.239 The Pew Oceans Commission re-
232 Aquaculture currently uses thirty-five percent of the world fishmeal supply, 
and by the year 2010 this is expected to increase to fifty-six percent. George Chamber-
lain and Stuart Barlow, A Balanced .4.ssessment of Aquaculture, The Advocate, August 
2000. See also, Naylor, Rosamond L., et aI, Effect of aquaculture on world fish supplies, 
405 Nature 1017-1024 (June, 2000). 
233 See Ronald A. Hites, et aI, Global Assessment of Organic Contaminants in 
Farmed Salmon, 303 Science 226-229 (January 9, 2004); PCBs in Farmed Salmon, 
Environmental Working Group, available at www.ewg.org/reportsifarmedPCBsI 
printversion.php (last visited March 29, 2004).; Food Safety Authority of Ireland, 
2002a. Summary of investigation of dioxins, furans, and PCBs in farmed salmon, wild 
salmon, farmed trout and fish oil capsules, available at http://193.120.54.7/ 
surveillancelfood/surveillancejood_summarydioxins.asp (last visited March 29, 2004). 
234 Pew Oceans Commission, supra note 10, at 73. 
235 FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 226, at Article 9. Article 9 addresses 
responsible development of aquaculture under national jurisdiction, within trans-
boundary aquatic ecosystems, use of aquatic genetic resources, and production. 
236 Id. at subsection 9.1.2. 
237 Id. at subsection 9.2.3. 
238 Id. at subsection 9.4.6. 
239 Id. As guidelines, the provisions of the F AO Code of Conduct are voluntary. 
Subsection 9.1.2, for example, provides that "States sh2Yld promote responsible devel-
opment and management of aquaculture, including an advance evaluation of the effects 
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cently called for stringent measures to minimize the adverse 
effects of marine aquaculture in U.S. waters by requiring aqua-
culture operations to be subject to national discharge permits 
and effluent limitations under the Clean Water Act. 240 The 
Commission also recommends banning the use of non-native 
species, and establishing a moratorium on new facilities until 
national standards are established.'41 A similar approach is 
needed to address this growing problem internationally. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Ultimately, the WSSD Plan of Implementation will accom-
plish little unless nations adopt measures to implement the 
goals, targets and timetables set forth in the Plan, and/or enter 
into enforceable international and regional agreements to im-
plement the WSSD. Accordingly, we offer the following rec-
ommendations: 
A. MSY MUST BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE 
PRECAUTIONARY AND ECOSYSTEM APPROACH, AND 
INTERPRETED TO RAISE MINIMUM POPULATION 
THRESHOLDS, NOT REDUCE ROBUST FISH STOCKS 
The absence of a specific reference to the precautionary 
approach in the oceans text of the Plan of Implementation 
should not be a pretext for continuing the use of failed concepts 
that have proven unsuccessful in sustaining world fish stocks. 
To restore fish stocks "on an urgent basis and where possible 
not later than 2015",242 it will be necessary to move beyond MSY 
as a standard for fisheries conservation and management. The 
precautionary approach has been enshrined in numerous in-
ternational agreements including the Fish Stocks Treaty, Prin-
ciple 15 of the Rio Declaration, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, and 
of aquaculture development on genetic diversity and ecosystem integrity, based on the 
best available scientific information." Subsection 9.2.3 provides that "States should 
consult with their neighbouring States, as appropriate, before introducing non-
indigenous species into transboundary aquatic ecosystems." (emphasis added) The 
'consultation' may enable the 'neighboring State' to protest and apply political pressure 
to stop the introduction non-indigenous species, but is merely a request to consult, and 
begs the question of whether non-indigenous species should be introduced. 
240 33 USC §131l(a). 
241 Pew Oceans Commission, supra note 10, at 126-127. 
242 WSSD, supra note 1, at 30(a). 
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the F AO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and is 
firmly imbedded in the ecosystem approach adopted in the 
Convention on Biological Diversity.243 According to at least one 
prominent international legal scholar, "the precautionary prin-
ciple has evolved from being a 'soft law' 'aspirational' goal to its 
present status as an authoritative norm recognized by govern-
ments and international organizations as a firm guide to activi-
ties affecting the environment.''''44 This concept is recognized in 
the United States.245 To meet the target of restoring fish stocks 
by 2015, allowable takes must be set well below MSY for each 
fish population of concern based upon levels of scientific uncer-
tainty and the natural variability of fish populations. 
B. OVERSIGHT FOR IMPLEMENTING WSSD COMMITMENTS IS 
URGENTLY NEEDED TO ENSURE THAT THE TARGETS AND 
TIMETABLES ARE INCORPORATED INTO NATIONAL FISHERY 
MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS AND THE CONDUCT OF 
VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS 
A specific blueprint should be developed to enable and en-
courage nations to carry out and track the commitments made 
in Johannesburg under the auspices of an international body 
such as the Commission on Sustainable Development or the 
FAO. The vast majority (eighty to ninety percent) offish stocks 
are captured within national 200-mile EEZs, and twenty per-
cent of world fish stocks are captured within the U.S. EEZ.246 It 
is therefore incumbent upon all nations, especially the United 
States, to heed the commitments of the WSSD to manage their 
fisheries responsibly, and join international, regional, and 
subregional agreements in adopting the targets and timetables 
proposed in the WSSD Plan of implementation. An excellent 
243 Gianni, supra note 217. 
244 Jon M. Van Dyke, "The Evolution and International Acceptance of the Precau-
tionary Principle" Bringing New Law to Ocean Waters, Boalt Hall School of Law, April 
5-6,2002. 
245 [M)anage stocks of uncertain status in a precautionary manner in response 
to the level of uncertainty." NOAA Fisheries Strategic Plan, May 1997 at 11. See also 
50 C.F.R. 600.350(d)(ii), "The Councils should adhere to the precautionary approach ... 
when faced with uncertainty concerning any of the factors" regarding bycatch and 
bycatch mortality. 
246 World's Imperiled Fish, supra note 47; Christopher J. Carr and Harry N. 
Scheiber, Dealing With A Resource Crisis: Regulatory Regimes For Managing The 
World's Marine Fisheries, 21 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 45, 51 (2002). 
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start for the United States would be to ratify UNCLOS and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity.247 Other international and 
regional agreements also should be examined to determine how 
they can be strengthened and/or developed to end destructive 
fishing practices such as bottom trawling on coral and sponge 
habitat and seamounts, to count, cap and control bycatch, and 
to increase the use of fishery observers to improve monitoring, 
reporting and compliance. 
C. ESTABLISH INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR MPAs TO 
PROTECT CRITICAL OCEAN RESOURCES 
Increasing the size and number of MP As including no-take 
marine reserves will help preserve pristine ocean ecosystems, 
and restore and replenish degraded ecosystems and fish stocks. 
There is a growing body of evidence that marine reserves en-
able some fish stocks to grow and regenerate outside protected 
areas. MP As and reserves are especially critical in hotspots of 
species diversity such as seamounts and areas where tropical 
and temperate species overlap!48 Therefore, international 
standards for developing MP As and marine reserves should be 
established to ensure that essential fish habitat, spawning ar-
eas, migratory routes, sea mounts, and other areas important 
to fish and the marine ecosystem are preserved and protected. 
D. ELIMINATE HARMFUL FISHING SUBSIDIES AT THE 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
The WSSD Plan of Implementation calls for the elimina-
tion of subsidies that contribute to IUD fishing and over-
capacity. To achieve this goal the WTO must act by its 2005 
meeting to effectively prohibit the most harmful types of fish-
ing subsidies, such as those that contribute to excess fishing 
capacity, overfishing, and destructive fishing practices. At the 
same time, the WTO must protect environmentally beneficial 
subsidies, such as those that provide sustainable fishing gear 
247 u.s. ratification should be accompanied by a formal clarification by the Senate 
that UNCLOS will not be interpreted to weaken or undermine more stringent domestic 
law. See supra text accompanying notes 112-113. 
248 O'Dor, Ronald K, The Unknown Ocean: The Baseline Report of the Census of 
Marine Life Research Program, Consortium for Oceanographic Research and Educa-
tion: Washington, DC, 11 (2003). 
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and vessel monitoring systems. It must also establish proce-
dures for effective monitoring and reporting of subsidies, and 
ensure that all government financial contributions are admin-
istered with the appropriate participation and oversight of in-
tergovernmental bodies and experts competent in fisheries 
management and the protection of the marine environment. 
E. AsSESS THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF ACTMTIES THAT 
AFFECT FISHERIES AND THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 
As a signatory to the WSSD Plan of Implementation the 
United States must (to the extent that it honors its interna-
tional commitments) "promote the use of environmental impact 
assessments and environmental evaluation and reporting tech-
niques for projects or activities that are potentially harmful to 
coastal and marine environments and their living and non-
living resources.'''·9 
The Magna Carta of U.S. environmental laws, the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (hereinafter "NEPA") requires 
the federal government to review the environmental impacts of 
all its activities and prepare an environmental impact state-
ment for any activity that significantly affects the quality of the 
human environment!50 Previous Administrations have applied 
NEPA to federal activities worldwide, including activities in 
the EEZ and the high seas!51 The Bush Administration, how-
ever, is reevaluating the application of NEPA and has argued 
in federal court that the federal government is under no obliga-
tion to assess potential harm to marine life under NEPA if an 
activity occurs in the EEZ!52 
This logic would exclude from environmental review under 
NEPA ocean industrial uses of the ocean for impacts on fish 
and marine life outside the territorial sea. Even as the Ad-
2.9 S WS D, supra note 1, at 33(c). 
250 42 USC §4322(C). 
251 Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1994), 
held that environmental assessments under NEPA applied to the construction of a 
waste disposal facility in Antarctica. 
252 The activities involved testing active sonar systems in the Pacific that deliver 
218-decibel blasts, similar to tests that resulted in several multi-marine mammal 
strandings, including 17 rare beaked whales in the Bahamas in March 2000. Natural 
Resources Defense Council Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Navy, (C.D. CA, CV-01-07781, Septem-
ber 17, 2002), F. Supp. 2d. 2002 WL 32095131. 
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ministration's position was struck down in federal court:53 a 
White House Task Force was examining ways to "streamline" 
NEPA by encouraging federal agencies to develop "categorical 
exclusions" to exclude certain federal activities from environ-
mental review.""" Each agency will determine which activities 
will be exempt from environmental review. 
Sonar testing, offshore energy, mining, dumping and other 
ocean activities must be reviewed for potential impacts on fish 
stocks and other marine resources under NEPA. The U.S. 
should fulfill the promise it made in Johannesburg and in other 
international agreements, and abandon its position that cer-
tain federal ocean activities are exempt from environmental 
review under NEP A. 
F. ESTABLISH INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR THE SITING, 
DESIGN AND OPERATION OF AQUACULTURE ACTIVITIES TO 
PROTECT THE MARINE ECOSYSTEM 
Marine finfish aquaculture is a growing industry fraught 
with risks to wild fish stocks, fisheries, and marine ecosystems. 
Paragraph 30(h) of the WSSD Plan of Implementation calls for 
"the sustainable development of aquaculture." But it does not 
set specific targets and timetables for binding international 
standards for siting, designing, and operating marine aquacul-
ture facilities to prevent escapes and avoid conflicts with other 
ocean uses, prevent the use of non-native and transgenic spe-
cies, minimize or prohibit the use of chemical pesticides and 
antibiotics, limit the use of fishmeal, and regulate the effluent 
discharged from marine aquaculture operations. There is an 
urgent need for binding international standards such as those 
recommended under the FOA Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries."55 
253 The court held that, "because the U.S. exercises substantial legislative control 
of the EEZ in the area of the environment stemming from its "sovereign rights" for the 
purpose of conserving and managing natural resources, the Court finds that NEPA 
applies to federal actions which may affect the environment in the EEZ." Id. at 21. 
254 Modernizing NEPA Implementation, The NEPA Task Force Report to the 
Council on Environmental Quality, September 2003, at xiii. 
255 FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 226, at Article 9. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The drastic decline in world fish stocks and marine biodi-
versity calls for an immediate and significant reduction in over-
fishing, destructive fishing practices, and habitat destruction 
and pollution. This will not occur merely because of the com-
mitments made at the WSSD. As the U.S. noted in Johannes-
burg, the Plan of Implementation does "not create legally bind-
ing obligations on States under international law, ll256 and the 
targets and timetables established at the WSSD are not self-
implementing. But they do provide a roadmap to address these 
threats in a variety of ways. 
In stark contrast with other issues addressed at the Sum-
mit, important and explicit targets and timetables were estab-
lished on key fishery issues such as maintaining and restoring 
fish stocks to MSY by 2015;257 encouraging the application of the 
ecosystem approach by 2010;258 implementing plans of action to 
address fishing capacity by 2005 and IUU fishing by 2004;25" 
significantly reducing the loss of biodiversity by 2010;260 estab-
lishing a regular process for global reporting and assessment of 
the state of the marine environment by 2004 under the United 
Nations;261 and developing representative networks of MPAs by 
2012.'62 
Even where there was no agreement on specific targets 
and timetables, the Plan of Implementation promotes sustain-
able fishing by calling for the elimination of fishing subsidies/63 
and the ratification and implementation of important interna-
tional agreements and instruments to address overfishing and 
destructive fishing practices such as UNCLOS,264 the Fish 
Stocks Treaty/65 the F AO Code of Conduct for Responsible 
256 Explanation of position by the U.S., supra note 184. 
257 WSSD POI, supra note 1, at 30(a). 
258 Id. at 29(d). 
25" Id. at 30(d). 
260 Id. at 42. 
261 Id. at 34(b). 
262 Id. at 31(c). 
263 Id. at 30(0. 
2&! Id. at 20(a). 
265 Id. at 30(b). 
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Fisheries:66 and portions of the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity!S7 
On the other hand, the WSSD failed to tackle problems 
with the concept of MSY, failed to commit to fully stop and re-
verse the loss of biodiversity, and adopted a weak statement on 
marine aquaculture.268 The Political Declaration issued by the 
Heads of State at the conclusion of the Summit failed to make a 
strong statement on the importance of the oceans or fisheries 
despite persistent lobbying by a diverse alliance of organiza-
tions and advocates!69 The Plan of Implementation also failed 
to adequately address invasive alien species in ballast water 
which threaten native fish stocks and are the second leading 
cause of biodiversity 10ss!70 
The Plan also fails to single out actions to specifically ad-
dress bycatch, responsible for wasting 25% of the world's fish 
catch. However, the problem of bycatch is at least implicitly 
addressed in numerous provisions that call for the use of the 
ecosystem approach, the elimination of destructive fishing 
practices, overcapacity and IUU fishing, implementation of the 
F AO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, ratification of 
the Fish Stocks Treaty, and restoration of fisheries to MSY. 
The WSSD has been criticized for failing to specifically call 
for the use of the precautionary approach with respect to ocean 
266 Id. at 30(c). 
267 Id. at 31(b). 
268 Id. at 30(h). 
269 A coalition of ocean groups issued a release stating that "the complete lack of 
any ocean language in the Draft Declaration is indicative of a lack of commitment by 
the Summit to take the problem (the degradation of the oceans) seriously." WDDS 
Misses the Boat: Draft Political Declaration Fails to Mention Oceans, Statement of 
Oceana, Wildlife Conservation Society, GEOTA, Natural Resources Defense Council, 
EcoLogic Development Fund, Center for the Study of Marine Policy, International 
Ocean and Coastal Organization, SOF Institute for Ocean Policy, NAUSICAA National 
Sea Center, Korea Maritime Institute, Global Coral Reef Alliance, WSSD Civil Society 
Global Forum on Oceans, September 3, 2002 (on file with the authors). 
270 Despite the urgent need to stop the spread of invasive alien species in ballast 
water, the Plan simply calls for "accelerating" measures to address invasive alien spe-
cies in ballast water and "urges" the IMO to finalize the Convention to control and 
manage ship's ballast water and sediments. It contains no targets and timetables. 
WSSD, supra note 3, at 33(b). Twelve billion tons of ballast water containing 10,000 
marine species at anyone time are shipped around the globe each year spreading alien 
and invasive species, and 40,000 gallons of foreign ballast water are discharged every 
minute into U.S. waters. Oceana, Hot Issues, World Summit on Sustainable Develop-
ment, available at www.oceana.org (last visited Mar. 26,2004). 
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fisheries.271 While such a reference would have been welcome, 
the precautionary approach is embedded in many other por-
tions of the text, and is part and parcel of many of the instru-
ments endorsed by the WSSD including the Fish Stocks Treaty, 
F AO Code of Conduct, and the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, among others. Thus, its absence in the oceans text should 
not be viewed as a retreat from an international commitment 
to use the precautionary approach in managing world fish 
stocks. 
All things considered, the oceans and sustainable fish 
stocks fared relatively well compared to the lack of significant 
progress made on many other critical issues at the World 
Summit (e.g.; renewable energy, corporate accountability, cli-
mate change, etc.). Given declining fish stocks and the precari-
ous state of the oceans, however, the progress at the World 
Summit did not fulfill the expectations of Rio; nor can it fully 
address the crises facing our oceans. Nevertheless, the explicit 
targets and timetables to address the world fish crisis was an 
important outcome of the WSSD. But the ultimate success of 
the World Summit will depend upon how nations fulfill the 
commitments they made in Johannesburg. 
271 Gianni, supra note 217. 
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